OMAN
A MARITIME HISTORY

Edited by
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Oman and Islamic Maritime Networks: 630–1507 CE

Eric Staples

And among His signs are the ships that sail like mountains through the seas.

(The Holy Qur'an 42:32)

Introduction

The region known as Oman today has always had an intimate relationship with the sea, and certain periods of its history provide particularly rich evidence for this maritime activity—especially the centuries between 632–1507 CE. (All the following dates in this chapter are Common Era unless otherwise specified). As Oman became part of the Islamic world, a variety of Islamic polities used naval force in an attempt to control its coasts. At the same time, Oman's commercial maritime routes extended outwards as far as the West Pacific Rim, dividing into a series of complex trade networks that carried goods, culture, religious ideas, and people with increasing frequency. All of this activity engendered maritime migrations as governors, sailors, soldiers, pilgrims, and merchants moved back and forth across the seas with greater frequency, altering the demographic topography of both Oman and the Indian Ocean littoral in the process. This chapter aims to analyze the diversity of maritime activity in the region of Oman and, when possible, integrate it into the context of the broader religious and commercial networks of the western Indian Ocean and Indo-West Pacific regions.

Sources

The sporadic and partial nature of sources as well as their positionality often renders the study of premodern history quite challenging. One of the main difficulties with the period of Omani history examined in this chapter is that the majority of the Omani historical chronicles, such as *Ta'rikh Ahl ʿUman*, *Kashf al-Ghumma, Fath al-Mubin*, and *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan,* were written 400 to 1250 years after the events they describe.[1] They are, however, invaluable sources because the authors often had access to primary sources no longer extant, and they address events not found in non-Omani sources. Nevertheless, the authors' temporal distance from the events they write about dictates that one approach their work with the appropriate caution.

More contemporaneous Omani sources do exist. For example, *Ansab al-ʾArab*, an historically-oriented genealogy, whose authorship has been questionably attributed to Abu al-Mundhir Salama b. Muslim al-ʿAwtabi, is particularly valuable for events up to the eleventh century.[2] There is also a relatively rich Ibadi literature that exists from this time period, such as the *fiqh* collections *al-Musannaf* and *al-Jamiʿa Ibn Jaʿfar*, as well as the *siyar* collections and religious histories. However, with some illuminating exceptions, these texts do not directly address the maritime questions that are the focus of this chapter.[3]

Rather, the majority of primary sources that do address maritime activity in Oman during this time period were written by outsiders. Classical Muslim historians, such al-Tabari and al-Baladhuri and later Ibn al-Athir and Ibn Khaldun, write about the naval battles, maritime invasions, and political machinations in Oman, Qays, and Hormuz.[4] Geographers, such as Ibn Khurdadhbih, Abu Zayd al-Sirafi, al-Masʿudi, al-Muqaddasi, Ibn Hawqal, al-Idrisi, and Yaqut, record Omani participation in maritime trade.[5] Middle Islamic travelers, such as Ibn Mujawir, Ibn Battuta, and al-Samarkandi, provide invaluable descriptions of their ports and the movements of people.[6] Non-Muslim visitors, such as Kia Tan and Marco Polo, provide an outside perspective, and describe aspects of the maritime trading world not seen as important in the historical chronicles.[7] Thus, despite the potential biases and inaccuracies they might contain, these invaluable documents are cited repeatedly in the modern historiography of the Indian Ocean because they constitute an essential resource for understanding this maritime history. They are prioritized due to their closeness to the period, but are woven in conjunction with the Omani historical chronicles when possible.

From Pre-Islamic to Imamate: 630–893

The introduction of Islam initiated gradual changes in the maritime realm that were to have a significant impact on the history of Oman in the following centuries. Most notably, an emerging series of Islamic maritime networks developed—along with the inevitable competition to control them. These extended farther, and were used with much greater frequency, than is evident in the pre-Islamic primary sources. The historical record indicates that Islam first came to Oman between approximately 628 and 630, when the Prophet Muhammad sent an ambassador to Oman. As the Arab historian al-Tabari (d. 923) relates,

> … *the Messenger of God sent ʿAmr b. al-ʿAs to collect alms (sadaqah) from Jayfar and ʿAmr, the two clans of al-Julandā from the Azd. They allowed ʿAmr b. al-ʿAs to collect the alms [without interference], and so he collected it [only] from the rich and returned [what he took] to the poor. He collected the poll tax (jizyah) from the Zoroastrians (al-Majūs) who were indigenous to that region, while the Arabs lived in the surrounding countryside.*[8]

It is apparent from al-Tabari's account—and those of other writers—that the majority of Oman's urban coastal population was a combination of urban Zoroastrians and Arab tribes from the surrounding areas and that members of the Arab Azd tribe were the first to convert to Islam. It is important to keep in mind that there was considerable ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity hidden within al-Tabari's categories. Arabs, Persians, hybrid Arab-Persians, and Jews practiced Zoroastrian, Christian, Jewish, and pagan rituals and communicated in Arabic, Persian, Hebrew, and Aramaic.

After their introduction to Islam, these varied Omani populations integrated quickly into the emerging Islamic state, in particular under the period of the *Rashīdūn*, the first four caliphs following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. The Julanda brothers remained local rulers of Oman under the direction of the Islamic state's governor of Eastern Arabia, and the Azdi tribes became involved in the Islamic conquests (the *futūh*), especially in Iraq and Persia, although they also extended their efforts to Sind and India.[9] During the period of *fitna* that tore apart the political unity of the expanding Islamic state, Oman was under the rule of ʿAbbad b. ʿAbd al-Julanda and later his two sons Saʿid and Sulayman al-Julanda, who were able to remain largely removed from the strife. The one exception—a short rebellion that coincided with a Kharijite invasion conducted by Najda b. ʿAmir al-Hanafi's forces in 688–89—was ultimately quelled by Saʿid and Sulayman, who had been collecting taxes by sea when it occurred.[10]

The scarcity of references to maritime endeavors makes it difficult to describe accurately Oman's naval activity in the seventh century.[11] The historical sources of the *futūh* indicate that the majority of the naval actions at that time were focused on the Mediterranean, and were largely absent in the Gulf and Indian Ocean region.[12] There are sporadic references to ships being used for expeditions to transport troops across the Gulf, such as when ʿUthman b. Abi al-ʿAs al-Thaqafi, Caliph ʿUmar's representative in Oman and Bahrain, moved newly converted Arab troops from the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula to conquer portions of the Persian coast in the period between 639 and 650. *Ansab al-ʿArab* states that Omani forces joined ʿUthman's campaign and sailed from Julfar to the islands of Barkawan (Ibn Kawan), Hormuz, and Qasm off the Persian coast in 640.[13] An alternative reference states that ʿUthman and his brother al-Hakam b. Abi al-ʿAs al-Thaqafi sent unsanctioned maritime expeditions to Thana and Barygaza in al-Hind, and Daybul in Sind in either 636 or 644.[14] These were not naval battles, but rather military expeditions traveling by sea, transporting troops that landed and conducted terrestrial campaigns. This is the predominant type of formal naval activity in the Arabian Gulf for the majority of this early period.

Likewise, there are few references to maritime commerce at this time. Certain continuities appear to have existed in Oman's maritime landscape between the pre-Islamic (*al-jahaliyya*) and Islamic periods, such as the transfer of certain essential goods throughout the western Indian Ocean, as well as the basic forms of maritime technology, such as a heavy reliance on sewn-plank boats with square sails. As outlined in the previous chapter, Oman in the Sasanian era was part of a larger Perso-Arab Sasanian maritime ecumene, what Wilkinson has referred to as the *Ard al-Hind*.[15] Textual sources do refer to maritime trade taking place in the Sasanian period, but archaeological examinations, in particular those by Kennet, have made a strong argument that the Sasanian presence was not as prosperous or widespread in eastern Arabia as Wilkinson had originally suggested.[16] The main ports appear to have been Sohar and Dabba (Dibba), which were controlled by the Julanda Maʿawil and ʿAtik clans, respectively, just prior to the Islamic era.[17] In addition, Damma (Dimma) near Seeb was one of the market towns frequented by the Arab tribes in Oman prior to the Islamic era, and Julfar was a coastal community at this time. On the Iranian mainland, the *Fathnamah-i Sind* reveals that a number of ports along the southern Iranian and Sind coasts, such as Jask and Daybul, were engaging in maritime commerce.[18]

Omani-Indian trade existed prior to the Islamic period for at least three millennia, and it continued in the seventh century. India was the source of a diversity of products, including grains, timber, textiles, medicines, and iron. In return, Omani merchant mariners exchanged the main exports of Oman's maritime trade: dates, dried fish, horses, frankincense, and copper, as well as goods, such as silver and gold, obtained from other locations in East Africa, Persia, and beyond.[19]

Although the archaeological record does not suggest an immediate drastic shift in the structures of this maritime trade with the coming of Islam, the Islamic conquests (*futūh*) initiated migrations that were ultimately to have far-reaching consequences in the following centuries.[20] Within Oman, tribes participated in the conquests and became part of a larger migration event, as Arab tribes and ethnically diverse "client" populations expanded and interacted with Amazigh, Greco-Roman, Aramaic, Persian, and Turkish populations from North Africa to Central Asia. This Muslim expansion, primarily by Arab tribes, restructured the previous Byzantine-Sasanian fault-lines in the region.[21]

However, few if any of the sources illustrate widespread maritime migration during the early *futūh*, which appears to have become more prevalent in the later periods. In the initial conquests, the main maritime migrations appear to be the movement of Arab troops to engage in a series of campaigns during the *futūh*, moving across from the Arabian Peninsula to Persia. This Arab-Persian pattern was not new, as a Parthian and Sasanian presence on the Omani coast, as well as Arab participation in Sasanian maritime trade, ensured a regular flow of people between the eastern Arabian and the Persian-Makran-Sind littorals.

One of the unintended consequences of these movements was that they facilitated maritime migrations, both direct and indirect, from Oman to Basra. With the establishment of this southern Mesopotamian garrison town during the early conquests, Omani Azdi populations moved north, establishing a strong connection between Oman and this emerging Islamic urban community. The Omani Azd emigrated to Basra in waves, the first after the Fars/Tawwaj campaigns when troops were shifted north c. 650, and the second sometime after 678. Collectively, they constituted a quarter in the city known as a *khums* (a fifth).[22]

The Muhallibi family is a specific example of this Omani-Basran migration. The most famous member of this family was Muhallab b. Abi Sufra (d. 701). He was the son of Zalim b. Sarrak al-ʿAtiki al-Azdi (a.k.a. Abu Safra), a captive from the Omani port of Dabba who was on the losing side in the Ridda wars and eventually settled in Basra. Al-Muhallib originally made a name for himself as a military leader, defeating the Khariji rebels with Tamimi and Omani Azdi forces in 683 and establishing a powerful family in southern Iraq in the process. He remained an influential figure under the Umayyad governor al-Hajjaj until his death in 701, taking part in campaigns in Khurasan and Kirman.[23] Although al-Muhallib was one of the more famous of the Omani migrants to Basra in traditional historical sources, others such as Jabir b. Zayd, one of the essential early figures of the Ibadi movement, were equally, if not more, significant because of their role in initiating a religious movement that was to have a profound impact on Oman in the succeeding centuries.[24]

Thus, as Oman adapted to Islamization in the seventh century, it appears to have engaged in the campaigns of conquest, with the resultant demographic and economic shifts and with a fair degree of local autonomy under the rule of the Julanda. These widespread movements of Omani tribes shifting with the conquests clearly involved a significant degree of maritime activity.

The Eighth Century

It is in the eighth century that we see the development of significant new factors in Omani maritime history. First, Ibadism emerged in Basra and spread to Oman, establishing itself as a potent religious and political force in the region. Second, the inhabitants of Oman struggled, often unsuccessfully, with both the Umayyad and ʿAbbasid states to retain a degree of autonomy and economic independence. Third, the robust trade networks that would become so evident in the ninth century began to form.

A brief note regarding terminology. The recent prominence of Indian Ocean studies has created on occasion a rather pervasive use of the term "Indian Ocean," even when referring to processes or phenomena that are sometimes either more expansive or more circumscribed than the boundaries of the Indian Ocean. The term "Indian Ocean" is used when appropriate, but I also use the terms "Indo-West Pacific" and "western Indian Ocean" when required. "Indo-West Pacific" is applied to networks, commerce, and migration developing in this time period that included China, slightly modifying Bryan Averbuch's use of the term Indo-Pacific to describe the luxury trade in the "Indian Ocean."[25] However, I will also rely on the more circumscribed term "western Indian Ocean," when necessary, to refer to processes in the westernmost part of this oceanic region, such as early Islamic naval expeditions or certain trade networks.




Figure 1: The Indo-West Pacific. Image courtesy of Alessandro Ghidoni.


KHANFU
SERENDIB
KALAH BAR
SUMATRA
JAVA

As mentioned previously, by the end of the seventh century, the sons of ʿAbbad b. ʿAbd Julanda, Sulayman and Saʿid, ruled jointly. Once the Umayyads established their authority in Iraq under the command of their governor, al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf al-Thaqafi, Oman once again came under the authority of the Umayyad state. However, with the growth of Ibadism in southern Iraq and the southern Arabian Peninsula, a short-lived Ibadi state was created in Oman under Imam Julanda b. Masʿud just before the Abbasids took over Oman. Abbasid authority gradually lapsed during the latter half of the eighth century, and another Ibadi polity, this time more enduring, was established in 793.

As a result of these political shifts, this period sees more references to maritime conflict, or at least naval expeditions, with evidence of maritime expeditions against Sind and Oman, as Umayyad and ʿAbbasid agents attempted to expand and defend their claims in outlying territories. During the Umayyad period, these were under the direction of the Iraqi governor al-Hajjaj, who was responsible for the establishment of Umayyad expansion in the Arabian Gulf and select areas of the western Indian Ocean.

Later Omani historical sources recount that an initial Umayyad expedition was sent to Oman under the command of Qasim b. al-Shaʿwah al-Muzani, who led a fleet through the Strait of Hormuz and south along the Omani coast, landing near Hattat. The Julanda leaders, supported by tribal levies, defeated the Umayyad forces. A second Umayyad force was then dispatched by land and sea, led by Qasim's brother, Mujaʿa b. al-Shaʿwah al-Muzani. The Umayyad naval force, reportedly a fleet of 300 ships, put in on the Batinah coast near Barka, where it defeated the army of Saʿid al-Julanda. The other Julanda brother, Sulayman then led a retaliatory attack against the Umayyad fleet, burning approximately fifty ships in Muscat harbor before the remaining ships were able to escape to sea. Finally, a third Umayyad force, led by ʿAbd al-Rahman b. Sulayman, arrived in Oman with reinforcements. News of this third wave drove the Julanda brothers and their supporters to flee the country by ship.[26]

There is also evidence for expeditions beyond the Arabian Gulf, as Islamic maritime forces entered the western Indian Ocean. Al-Baladhuri reports that raiders from Daybul (in Sind) took a ship from the ruler of Ceylon and carried away the daughters of Muslim merchants who had been on the island. This action prompted the Umayyad governor al-Hajaj to launch a 6,000-man expedition against Daybul, under the command of his young nephew Muhammad b. Qasim, whose forces took the city and surrounding areas in 711 and eventually created a Muslim colony.[27]

The Daybul seizure of the Ceylonese merchant ship typified the often informal and predatory nature of maritime raiding that was an enduring aspect of seafaring in the Indian Ocean. It was a violent counterpart to legitimate maritime trade, and was intricately bound to the seaborne commerce that it relied on for its existence. This raiding involved the capture of merchant vessels or quick strikes on coastal communities, and was used often by polities as a means to establish control of the sea or to appropriate revenues for the state. Marginalized maritime communities also took to raiding to gain what wealth they could from seaborne trade.

Maritime studies of the Indian Ocean prior to 1500 often highlight its flourishing maritime commerce, while deemphasizing its more violent and dangerous aspects.[28] These more aggressive activities included piracy, which is robbery at sea, unsanctioned by a political entity, and corsair activity, which involves the appropriation of goods with the support of a state. In reality, however, the distinctions between these two modes of theft are somewhat fluid because corsairs were often referred to as "pirates" by those who did not accept or acknowledge the political dimensions of their attacks. Given the frequent confusion over these terms, I prefer the phrase "maritime raiding," which is less politically charged than "piracy" and is closely related to the Arabic word *ghazwa*, which applies to a similar practice on land.[29]

The mid-eighth century witnessed an increase in naval expeditions as the region's political landscape shifted. There is indirect evidence of a naval campaign conducted by the first Imam as Ibadi forces took control of the Indian Ocean island of Socotra to the south of Yemen in 750. However, this assertion of naval force was short-lived, as Oman's political independence under the first Imam was quickly suppressed by the emerging ʿAbbasid state.

Once the ʿAbbasids had established themselves in Baghdad, more naval expeditions took place. Among these was an initial force sent by sea from Basra to combat the Ibadi community in Oman, which had risen up to elect Julanda b. Masʿud as its new Imam.[30] In 751–52, Abu al-ʿAbbas, sent an army and fleet commanded by Khazim b. Khuzaymah al-Khurasani to attack the Sufriyya Kharijite community in Bahrain and the Ibadi forces in Oman.[31] Ultimately, Khazim and his troops were able to overcome the Ibadi *shurat* and initiated ʿAbbasid control of Oman. The forty-year period following this invasion is one portrayed as a time of strife and discord as different factions of the al-Julanda, al-Hinai, and al-Harth tribes fought with one another. There are also references to maritime raiding of the Omani coasts in this period.[32]

The eighth century also sees the emergence of Islamic maritime networks expanding throughout the Indo-West

Pacific littoral. Oman further strengthened its connection with the Arabian Gulf, particularly with Basra and its merchant community. Two important factors in this process were the emergence of Ibadism and Umayyad (and later ʿAbbasid) involvement in Oman's regional affairs.

The emerging Ibadi community, particularly under the leadership of Jabir b. Zaid, one of the founding fathers of the Ibadi movement, developed connections with his homeland in Oman, as well as in Yemen. Basra and its port Ubulla became one of the great centers of Islamic trade, through which the goods of the Indo-West Pacific funneled their way into the heartlands of Iraq and greater Syria.[33] Ibadi missionaries known as *hamalat al-ʿilm* created an extensive Ibadi network centered in Basra that spanned much of the Islamic world at that time, from North Africa to India. The Azd were an integral part of this network, and it was their connections, in particular with South Arabia, that helped establish Ibadism in that region.[34]

Gradually, a religious-economic network with maritime links emerged. For example, the prominent Ibadi activist/scholar Hajib al-Taʿiy used profits from maritime trade—including those of the merchants Abu ʿUbayda ʿAbd Allah b. al-Qasim and Nadhar al-Maymun, who had both been to China—to initiate the southern Arabian Ibadi states.[35] The northern flow of Azdi migration of the seventh century reversed, as missionaries and religious scholars, such as Abu Sufyan Mahbub b. al-Rahil and Bashir b. Mundhir al-Nazwani, moved south from Basra to Oman, where they helped strengthen Ibadism.[36]

This Basran trade received a significant boost once the capital of Islamic empire transposed itself from Umayyad Damascus to Baghdad under the ʿAbbasids around 750. With this shift, the fortunes of the Gulf and northern Omani ports flourished, as the economic fortunes of the ʿAbbasid and Tang dynasties flowed through its waters. And while the political ʿAbbasid-era narrative in Oman is one of strife and conflict, it is apparent that maritime trade was prospering, perhaps due in part to its increased connections to ʿAbbasid Basra.[37]

Trade and migration also extended beyond the Arabian Gulf. On one hand, the flows of people to and from Oman and the Makran-Sind coast continued. Members of an Omani family, the al-Alafi of the Bani Asamat, migrated to Makran after the Umayyad invasion. Apparently, an Umayyad representative executed Safhni b. Lam al-Hamami, a member of the al-Alafi family, which caused the family to retaliate, killing the Umayyad governor. They migrated yet again with at least 500 members from Makran to Sind, worked for the Hindu ruler of Daybul at the beginning of the eighth century, and eventually became part of the local elite.[38]

There are references to trade and migration with East Africa. Towards the end of the Umayyad invasion of Oman, the two rulers of the Julanda clan, Saʿid and Sulayman, were informed by an Azdi spy in the Umayyad ranks of an impending attack.

They [Saʿid and Sulayman] perceived that they were unable to resist longer, and taking with them their families' property and those of their tribe who chose to follow them, they reached one of the districts of the Zanj, where they abode until their death.[39]

Archaeological evidence supports the initial establishment of Islamic communities in East Africa in the eighth century, although perhaps at a slightly later period than the Julanda brothers' account. Although settlements such as Fukuchani and Unguja Ukuu on Zanzibar date to the late seventh century and feature evidence of Indian Ocean trade—including torpedo jars, turquoise-glazed wares, and glass beads—it is not until the mid-eighth century that the sites of Ras Mkumbu'u on Pemba Island and Shanga show evidence of Islamic graves and wooden mosques, and small quantities of Chinese pottery.[40]

Evidence exists for long-distance Muslim maritime trade with China in the eighth century, and more significantly of Arab merchants traveling directly to China and back. The Umayyad poet al-Farazdaq from Basra wrote the following lines in 717, suggesting that political refugees from Iraq might have lived in China at the time:

Proclaim on my behalf to those who are in China, or whom frail planks [of wood] with their sails toss at [the coast of] India: "Come to Islam, justice is among us, the disease of Iraq [al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf] is dead!"[41]

The Arabic sources record that Ibadi merchants Abu ʿUbayda ʿAbd Allah b. al-Qasim from Bisya and Nazar al-Maymun, mentioned previously for their contributions in funding the initial Ibadi uprisings, traveled to China in the mid-eighth century.[42] The majority of the references for direct trade from Southwest Asia to China prior to this are from ninth- and tenth-century historians, who refer to "Chinese ships" being present in the Arabian Gulf as early as the Sasanian period. Arab historians, such as al-Baladhuri and al-Tabari, refer to Chinese ships in the southern Iraqi port of Uballa during the *futūh*, and the geographer al-Masʿudi states that Chinese ships came to Hira prior to Islam. The ninth-century historian Ibn Habib states that a Chinese ship was in the Omani port of Dabba during the reign of the Julanda prior to the coming of Islam.[43] This textual evidence suggests that "Chinese ships" were mak-

ing voyages to the Arabian Gulf immediately prior to the Islamic era, but the meaning of "Chinese ships" is a subject of debate. It could refer to ships from China, ships that travel to China, or just ships that carry goods from China.[44] This ambiguity and the lack of definitive archaeological evidence cautions against making any authoritative assertions regarding the presence of Chinese ships in the Gulf prior to the Islamic era.

Although there are references to Nestorians migrating to Southeast Asia in the Sasanian period, the first Chinese references to Persian (*bosi*) individuals in China are not until 671.[45] However, the Tang histories, both the "Old Book of Tang" (945) and the "New Book of Tang" (1044–66) state that a joint Persian-Arab (*bosi-dashi*) maritime expedition attacked Guangzhou in 758 and the Chinese leader Tien-Sien-King killed thousands of *dashi* and *bosi* immigrants in retaliation.[46] Although the evidence is still sporadic for trade with China at this time period, it is more abundant than the isolated references of the seventh century. Over the next century, the sources reveal an expansion in the number and size of Arab merchant communities, which in turn evolve into more well-documented trade networks in the ninth century.

The First Imamate: 795–893

Several decades after the ʿAbbasid invasion, another more long-lived Ibadi Imamate was established in 793, first with Imam Muhammad b. ʿAbd Allah Ibn Abi ʿAffan (r. 793–95) and then with Imam Warith b. Kaʿab al-Kharusi (r. 795–807).[47] Initially, it appears to have been a land-based polity, with neither of the Imams engaging in maritime naval encounters until the Abbasids sent another fleet to subjugate Oman in the beginning of the ninth century. This invasion was led by ʿIsa b. Jaʿfar b. Sulayman, who was later made governor of Oman.[48] The commander of the Ibadi tribal forces (*shurāt*) and governor of Sohar, Muqarish b. Muhammad al-Yahmadi, attacked the ʿAbbasid forces and drove them back to sea. ʿIsa tried to escape, but three ships captured him and brought him back to Sohar—evidence that the Ibadi Imamate had ships at its disposal prior to the usual date given for the establishment of a formal navy under Imam Ghassan b. ʿAbd Allah over a decade later.[49]

Regardless of this ambiguity, the Ibadi state became a genuine naval power under the reign of Imam Ghassan b. ʿAbd Allah al-Yahmadi (r. 808–23). At the time, maritime raiding in the Arabian Gulf and Arabian Sea was a problem. A letter (*sīra*) from the time addressed to Imam Ghassan from one of the Ibadi missionaries from Basra, Munir b. al-Nayyir al-Riyami al-Jaʿlani, deplores the attacks of pirates in the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and in particular their recent killing of fifty people.[50] In response to this problem, Imam Ghassan moved to Sohar for five years (816–21) and established what is referred to as Oman's first naval force, to protect Omani maritime communities and ships from attack by Indian maritime raiders known as *al-bawārij*.[51] The account of this event is found, with some alterations, in several more modern historical Omani chronicles. *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan* provides the most complete version:

> *The bawārij—who are kuffār from al-Hind—hampered the regions of Oman, plundering, taking prisoners and harassing towards al-Fars and al-ʿIraq, and it reached us that they were heading towards Dibba and Julfar. Ghassan set out in a shadha [a type of ship] for a naval expedition, and he was the first in Oman to undertake [such an endeavor]. He attacked these raiders on these shores, and protected the people from the bawārij with these shadhaʿāt.*[52]

The *bawarij* were maritime marauders from India and Sind who took their name from the type of ship they used: *al-bārija*, pl. *bawārij*. They are frequently mentioned in sources of the ninth and tenth centuries in association with maritime raiders from India, as well as tribal grouping such as the Mīd from Sind. They attacked the prosperous Indo-West Pacific trade, and Imam Ghassan's campaign was clearly a state-sponsored attempt to to ensure the safety of shipping in Omani waters, protect his subjects, and generally expand the maritime trade upon which the Imamate depended for its revenue.

After this initial campaign, Ghassan's naval force became an important element of the Imamate. The state had coalesced from a simple governing body into a more complex polity, with a leader supported by a legal-administrative religious elite (the ʿulamaʾ) and protected, initially, by the rather politically independent holy warriors, *shurāt*, and, later, by a standing military.[53] This expansion of military power in particular took place under Imam Muhanna b. Jayfar al-Yahmadi (r. 841–51), who was reported to have 300 ships in his navy.[54] The navy not only protected shipping, but also maintained control over the Indian Ocean dominions, such as the island of Socotra off the coast of Yemen, which was ideally situated along the trade routes to East Africa and the Red Sea. According to *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, after a group of Christians overthrew Islamic rule in Socotra, Imam Salt b. Malik al-Kharusi (r. 851–885/6) sent a fleet of 101 ships to re-establish control of this strategic island.[55] Shortly after this campaign, however, the Ibadi state was torn apart by succession issues involving an aging Imam Salt b. Malik at the end of the ninth century.

Sohar and the Indo-West Pacific Routes under the First Imamate: 805–893

With the establishment of the maritime dimensions of the first Ibadi Imamate in the ninth century, Oman asserted control over its coasts and engaged in a series of naval and commercial endeavors, primarily via Sohar. Sohar thus became the center of Oman's maritime activity as Indo-West-Pacific trade expanded in the ninth century. As a result of her excavations of Sohar, Kevran writes that the "import of ceramics from India as well as from China reaches its climax" in level VI (750–1250), as ceramics shift to a polychrome painted ceramic on a thin-textured ware that she attributes to the Indus delta sites as trade shifted from western to northern India.[56] This period also matches the apex of the Samarra horizon in the archaeological record, showing the height of this trade in the ninth century.[57]

This growth in maritime trade is also documented in the Ibadi jurisprudence literature of the period as legal scholars established a collection of rulings to deal with issues related to maritime trade in Sohar. Wilkinson contends that a series of rulings in the fiqh literature regarding customs and tariff charges for cargoes were most likely made by the Ibadi legal scholar Abu ʿAbd Allah from Basra, who was the *qadi* of Sohar (863–73). Sohar was known for its relatively attractive custom rates, 2.5% for Muslims and 5% for Christians. Merchants that were neither Muslim nor Christian paid the same tariff that was charged in their home port, and transit goods were exempt from duties if stored for less than a year. Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian merchants lived in Sohar at this time and helped create a rich multicultural community, whose commercial activities were mediated by a commercially favorable Ibadi legal system.[58]

Although Sohar appears to have been Oman's preeminent entrepôt, ceramic evidence from several other ports such as Mirbat, Raysut, Masirah (i.e., Masirah site 17), and Damma (before it was devastated by a major flood in 865) illustrate that smaller Omani ports also engaged in this international trade, either as direct links or as regional redistribution centers for Sohar.[59] In addition, finds in al-Buraymi from the ninth century show an expansion in international trade with the interior as goods from this maritime trade were being transported from Sohar through Wadi al-Jizzi.[60]

However, the most significant evidence of the increase in maritime trade comes from outside the Southwest Asian region. The Belitung shipwreck, discovered in 1998 off Belitung Island, Indonesia, contained a vast collection of East Asian cargo. Dated to approximately 826, these included over 60,000 pieces of Chinese ceramics,



Figure 2: Changsha ware from the Belitung wreck. Image courtesy of Alessandro Ghidoni.

among which were some of the earliest intact examples of blue-and-white ware and green-splashed ware. The majority of the ceramics were Changsha bowls, which were widely popular outside of China. In addition, the cargo contained luxury goods, including golden bowls and cups, silver bowls and platters, and bronze mirrors. Arabic inscriptions on some of the items suggest that the cargo was bound for the Southwest Asian market.



Figure 3: Vases from the Belitung wreck. Image courtesy of Alessandro Ghidoni.



Figure 4: Jewel of Muscat, a ninth-century reconstruction of the Belitung ship, sailing across the Bay of Bengal. Image courtesy of Robert Jackson.

The remains of the ship itself revealed that its planks were stitched rather than nailed together, using a method prominent in the western Indian Ocean at that time. Furthermore, the timber used to build the vessel consisted of *afzelia Africana* from East Africa and teak, *tectona grandis*, from India. The use of these two woods strongly suggests that it was constructed somewhere in between these two regions, such as the Arabian Peninsula. The immensely rich cargo corroborates the descriptions of luxuries described in the historical sources from the ninth and tenth centuries.[61]

Chinese trade with the Gulf region is discussed in Arabic geographical sources. Ibn Kurdadhbih and the *Akhbar al-Sin wal-Hind* both describe the routes from Siraf and Sohar to Guangzhou (Canton) in the mid-ninth century, mentioning that Sohar and to a lesser extant Muscat were important ports on the routes to China.[62] In Guangzhou itself, a sizable and multicultural merchant community had established itself by the second half of the ninth century. Al-Masʿudi (d. 956) provides an account of the port:

This is a very large town, situated on a river greater than the Tigris, or about the same: it falls into the sea of China, six or seven days' from the said city. Through this river the ships go up which come from al-Basra, Siraf, Oman, the various towns of India and al-Sind, the islands of al-Zanj, from al-Sanf and other countries, with their cargoes and goods. This town is inhabited by Muslims, Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians, besides the Chinese.[63]

Although the specific details remain uncertain, it is clear that this large merchant community became a source of great tension among segments of the Chinese population. In 878, Huang Chao led his rebel army in a massive attack on the foreign merchants in Guangzhou, killing an estimated 120,000 to 200,000 people.[64]

Back in the western Indian Ocean, the movement of people from East Africa to Southwest Asia also increased during this period, in particular due to the slave trade. The Zanj wars (869–93) are the most dramatic evidence of such large-scale forced emigration. These wars are described in depth by al-Tabari, who lived through them. Collectively, they were a series of large-scale rebellions of African migrants (*zanj*), most of whom were slaves living in harsh conditions brought to remove the topsoil from the marshlands of southern Iraq. Certain Arab groups joined these slaves, and together they successfully took over large portions of southern Iraq and Khuzestan, including the city of Basra, before the ʿAbbasid caliphate was eventually able to subdue them.[65]

There is also evidence of maritime commerce and migration with India. Coastal Indian polities, such as the Deccan al-Ballahara (Rashtrakutas) state (743–974), were significant trading destinations, exporting aromatics, timber, cotton, and indigo among other items.[66] Kerala's timber and pepper trade was growing significantly, and it is mentioned as an important stop on the route to China in *Akhbar al-Sin wal-Hind*. All of this commercial traffic engendered further migration to both Indian and Omani ports. For example, the governor of Kulam Malay issued a series of Tamil decrees written on the Tharisappalli copper plates in 849, giving foreign merchant communities certain religious and commercial rights. The witnesses signed their names in Arabic, Pahlavi, and Hebrew, indicating that Muslims, Jews, and Zoroastrians were all settled in Kulam Malay and engaging in this lucrative pepper and timber trade.[67] Indian merchants and mercenaries were also living in Sohar. The later Omani chronicles mention that Mattar al-Hindi and his Indian soldiers were in the employ of the Imam Muhanna's army during a Musandam campaign, rescuing bulls from a fire and not acting in accordance with Islamic rules of warfare.[68]

Thus, the period 630–893 witnesses several significant developments as Omanis participated in a maritime expansion, first through the Islamic conquests and later through the series of maritime Islamic trade networks developing throughout Asia and East Africa. The use of naval power became a prominent part of its contested political landscape as external states such as the Umayyads and ʿAbbasids sent fleets to invade its coasts and maritime raiding grew with the emerging maritime trade. An Ibadi polity evolved, establishing a maritime state that organized a standing navy and derived a significant portion of its revenues from this seaborne trade.

Transitions and Multipolarities: 893–1250

From 893 to 1250, a new dynamic emerged in Oman. Politically, it became significantly more multipolar, with local vassal states (Wajihads and Makramids), kingdoms (Nabhanid), and Ibadi Imamates interacting with land-based Daylami and Turkish military states, as well as emerging maritime-based port states (Qays and Hormuz). All of these powers competed with one another for control of Oman's coasts.

Economically, it was also a time of change, as the patterns of maritime trade altered. The transition away from the single, dominant port of Sohar, to a more multipolar and equitable distribution of maritime wealth between Hormuz, Muscat, Qalhat, and Zufar constituted a major shift. Although Sohar remained prosperous in the tenth

and eleventh centuries, Arabian Gulf trade transitioned to a more southerly orientation and Sohar gradually declined as Qays and later Hormuz grew. At the same time, an increased flow of goods to the Red Sea created new opportunities to the south.

Interaction with many of the political and commercial actors inevitably had a maritime dimension. Since most of these political movements originated either in Iraq, Bahrain, or Persia, and most of the commerce came from the shores of the Indo-West Pacific, their primary form of movement to and from Oman was by sea. Thus, the sea continued to be the source of sustenance and commerce, as well as invasion and conflict, for Oman.

Fragmentation and Realignment Part I (893–1050): The ʿAbbasids, Qarmatians, Wajihads, Buyids, Makramids, and the Second Imamate

With the deposition of Imam al-Salt b. Malik in 885–86, the unity of the Imamate was torn apart, and multiple imams were elected. In 893, two members of a disenfranchised faction approached the ʿAbbasid governor Muhammad b. Nur (alternately Thur or Bur) to request his assistance in their local disputes, and an ʿAbbasid army—reportedly 25,000 strong—once again entered Oman under his command.[69] The later Omani chronicles lament his rule: "He caused people to have their hands, feet, and ears cut off, their eyes put out, and generally treated the inhabitants with the greatest severity and contempt."[70] However, Muhammad b. Nur did not remain in Oman long; he soon installed a governor in Sohar, Ahmad b. Hilal (or al-Khalil), to rule on his behalf while he returned to Bahrain.[71] As the ʿAbbasid representative in Oman, Ahmad funneled the considerable profits derived from Sohar's maritime trade to Baghdad, sending hard currency, as well as more exotic gifts, such as black gazelles, golden idols, and Farsi-speaking mynah birds, to the ʿAbbasid court.[72]

Interestingly, these ʿAbbasid invasions created an exodus, as many in Oman, and Sohar in particular, fled the threat of chaos and destruction. As *Ansab al-ʿArab* states: "The people of Sohar and the surrounding areas of the Batinah were afraid, and left with their possessions, dirhams, and their families to Siraf, Basra, and Hormuz."[73] It provides the personal example of Sulayman b. ʿAbd al-Malik al-Salimi fleeing with his family and dependents on a few ships to Hormuz, where he remained for the rest of his life.[74] Many perhaps also fled to the small states of Omani origins that had previously established themselves on the Iranian mainland, such as the Al ʿUmara at the mouth of the Gulf, the Al Bu Zuhayr, and the Al Saffar in Fars.[75] This exodus and these migrant states were part of a larger, long-term process of demographic cross-fertilization between the Omani and Persian coasts.

The Qarmatians also expanded towards Oman. The origins of the Qarmatians are contested, but what is apparent is that they were a messianic Ismaili Shiʿite movement originating from Eastern Arabia (al-Hasa) at the end of the ninth century. Espousing beliefs such as the illegitimacy of pilgrimage to Mecca and the coming of a final Messiah, they quickly spread throughout much of the Arabian Peninsula and southern Iraq, conquering Basra in 923, almost reaching Baghdad in 927, and sacking Mecca in 930—an event which shocked the Islamic world.[76] The Qarmatians, along with the North African Fatimids and Buyid polities have been referred to collectively as the "Shiʿite challenge," in which a religious movement, which had been thought in decline, made a resurgence on the Islamic political landscape in the tenth century.[77]

The Qarmatians first became involved in Oman in the early tenth century, when they mounted overland expeditions in 905–6 and 917, establishing a base in Tuʾam (al-Buraymi). Oman at this time was a contested space, with the ʿAbbasids based on the coast and Sohar under the rule of their governor Ahmad b. Hilal, while the Ibadi movement controlled the interior. The Qarmatians used their base in Tuʾam (al-Buraymi), to make forays into other parts of Oman, such as Sohar and Nizwa, and were eventually able to control tax revenues in parts of the interior of Oman from 930 to 985.[78] In addition, they taxed and regulated much of the pearling activity in the Gulf. Although the Qarmatians did not directly engage in large-scale naval battles, preferring to rely on their allies, such as the Wajihads, they did undertake maritime raiding throughout the Gulf, as their state attempted to reappropriate some of the wealth that was traveling along the Indo-West Pacific routes to Baghdad.[79]

While the Qarmatians encroached on a reduced and divided Imamate in the interior, the Wajihad state (r. 926–62) established itself on the Omani coast during the tenth century. The founder, Yusuf b. Wajih (d. 926–52), ruled over significant portions of Oman, including portions of the coast.[80] With the assistance of the Nizari tribes, he established a maritime state with its capital in Sohar. At the time, the multipolar political landscape consisted of an aggressive Qarmatian state to the north, a weakened Ibadi Imamate in the interior, a rising Buyid state in Persia and Iraq, and the fading claims of the ʿAbbasid Empire. Yusuf thus resorted to a series of political alliances and conflicts with these political powers in order to maintain control of the maritime revenues of the state.[81]

The Wajihads were a naval power, and there are reports of Yusuf b. Wajih conducting two naval campaigns against Basra. During the first, he provided naval support for a campaign directed by Amir al-Umla in Baghad against the "Persian adventurer" Abu ʿAbd Allah ʿAli b. Muhammad al-Baridi in 942. In spite of some initial success, his entire fleet was eventually destroyed by two clandestine fireboats that, under the cover of darkness, approached the Wajihad fleet, which was strung together to form a bridge across the river and set them alight before they could untie from one another.[82] The second campaign against the Buyids in Basra in 952–53 was supposed to have been in conjunction with the Qarmatian land forces. However, they never arrived, forcing Yusuf to withdraw and severely straining his relationship with the Qarmatians.[83] The Wajihad state came to an end in 962, after the final ruler was murdered by one of his slaves, al-Nafiʿ, who then attempted to rule in this place.[84]

Once the Wajihad state had fallen, Oman's political landscape continued to be contested, but with a new series of polities as the Buyids become more influential and a new series of local actors, such as the Makramids and the Imams of the second Ibadi Imamate, came to the fore. Similar to other contested political environments, such as the Taifa states of eleventh-century al-Andalus, commerce and culture thrived in the face of such fractured political competition, and migration from the Iranian mainland became more pronounced.

The Buyids were a powerful force that took over much of the ʿAbbasid empire and ruled in its name for much of the period of 934–1062. They were a collection of infantry forces led by ambitious commanders from Daylam, located in Iran south of the Caspian Sea, who were reportedly Shiʿite. These Daylami foot soldiers, fighting in conjunction with Turkish cavalry, Arab tribesmen, and Kurdish forces, established control of most of Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf. As a military state, they relied heavily on the *iqtaʿ*, or land grant, in exchange for military service. The name of the dynasty itself is derived from the father of the three founders, a fisherman called Buya. His sons—ʿAli (ʿImad al-Dawla), al-Hasan (Rukn al-Dawla), and Ahmad (Muʿizz al-Dawla)—were particularly skilled military leaders and statesmen. They established states for themselves in Rayy, Fars, and Baghdad, respectively. They and their descendants were technically servants of the ʿAbbasid caliphate and took names illustrating their support of the ʿAbbasid state (al-Dawla), but in reality they had effective control of the empire, transforming the Caliph into a puppet.[85] They should not be viewed as a centralized monolithic state, but rather as a coalition of intersecting polities with a degree of shared interest and a high level of internal competition.

They first became involved in Oman in 962–63, after they had established themselves throughout much of the eastern Islamic ʿAbbasid territories. Unlike the Qarmatians in Eastern Arabia, the Buyids were based in Persia, and thus, their significant initial series of invasions of Oman were naval expeditions. An initial attempt in 962 failed, but Muʿizz al-Dawla (r. 945–67) sent another force under Kardak al-Naqib in 964 and received the initial submission of the local populace.[86] However, a subsequent rebellion drove Buyid forces out of the country, and in 965–66 a major invasion led by Abu al-Faraj Muhammad b. ʿAbbas landed in both Julfar and Sohar. Seventy-nine to eighty-nine Omani ships were reportedly destroyed in this campaign in Sohar.[87]

But the unrest did not end with this expedition. Another rebellion of Persian and African Zanj troops in the Buyid army took place in Oman in 972. Once again, a Buyid fleet was sent, this time by ʿAdud al-Dawla (r. 949–83), defeating the rebel fleet near Sohar and reestablishing Buyid control over most of the coast.[88] Yet another Ibadi uprising against the Buyids resulted in a final Buyid invasion in 973, under the command of ʿAbd al-Qasim al-Mathar b. Muhammad b. ʿAbd Allah.[89] Once in control in 973, the Buyids held at least nominal control of portions of Oman for the next eighty years. These initial campaigns incorporated Sohar into the Buyid political realm, connected the three most important ports of Ubulla, Siraf, and Sohar within a single polity, and ensured access to the Indian Ocean.[90]

But the Buyids were often too distant to rule directly, and an alternative polity eventually established itself in Oman with Buyid backing. Abu Muhammad al-Husayn b. Makram (r. 1000–1024) was originally involved in maritime trade in Oman and the Gulf. He was appointed governor of Oman at the end of the tenth century by the Buyid leader Baha' al-Dawla (r. 998–1012). From his capital in Sohar, he expanded his control in the interior of Oman and across the sea to Kirman in the Iranian mainland before he was succeeded by his son Abu al-Qasim ʿAli b. al-Husayn (r. 1024–37). They ruled a somewhat independent state, based on the revenues of maritime trade in the Gulf, and maintained a strong fleet for its protection. They controlled portions of the coast as well as Tu'am for the first half of the eleventh century but were ultimately defeated by the rising of the Second Imamate in the mid-eleventh century.[91]

This rise of what has been referred to as "the Second Imamate" in the interior took place in the first half of the eleventh century and eventually spread to Yemen and the Gulf. This involved the Imamate state governed by Imam al-Khalil b. Shadhan and Imam Rashid b. Saʿid. The first leader, Imam al-Khalil (r. 1016–33), fought to

establish an Imamate, engaging with Yemeni Ibadi actors and pushing towards Sohar at the expense of the Buyid Makramids.[92] However, it was his successor, Imam Rashid b. Saʿid (r. 1033–53), who took Sohar, and established what has been described as "a unified and powerful state that incorporated Hadramawt and expanded overseas as well, not only conducting trade but also propagating Ibadisim."[93] Imam Rashid was a Yahmadi from the Batinah (Sawni), near Rustaq, who established an Imamate that incorporated political allegiances in the Hadramawt and Bahrain, as well as missionary connections in Sind and the Makran. He took over Sohar during the final years of the Buyid rule, abolishing what were considered to be unjust taxes and gaining control of the revenues of maritime trade. Unfortunately, a controversial decree just before his death on doctrinal matters split the Ibadi Imamate, and, with the Saljuq invasions, the Imamate receded back into the interior, only holding on to the port of Damma as its access point to the sea.

Many of these political actors were local representations of larger historical processes taking place in the Islamic world at the time. The Qarmatians represent the larger initial challenge that Shiʿite polities such as the Fatimids in the west were making to existing Islamic states. The rise of the Daylami Buyid family reflects a Persian political resurgence in this period. Evidence of an Ibadi struggle to establish viable Imamates, such as that of Rashid b. Saʿid, illustrate specifically Omani reflections of larger Arab resistance to these processes of external control and alternative cultural influences. These larger processes helped initiate military migrations, as successive waves of Persian, African, Turkish, and Daylamite occupiers ebbed and flowed over the shores of Oman, altering the demographic realities on the ground in the process. The rebellion against the Buyids in 972 was initiated by Persian and East African troops left in Oman from the previous campaign. In addition, there were continual outflows of Omani populations due to changing political circumstances.

In spite of this politically diverse environment, the maritime economy continued to flourish. The wealth from the Indo-West Pacific trade was still funneling into Oman and the Gulf, and the machinations and maneuverings of the various political actors were often attempts to obtain the proceeds of this wealth. Yusuf b. Wajih's first attack on Basra, for example, was to resist the raising of tariffs on maritime goods in Basra. The initial power of the Makramids was based on their maritime commercial relations in the Gulf. Tenth-century geographers, such as al-Masʿudi, al-Muqaddasi, al-Istakhri, and the anonymous author of *Hudud al-ʿAlam*, still describe Sohar as a prosperous port.

An interesting source of maritime commerce in this time period is that of the Iraqi Shiʿite polymath Abu al-Hasan ʿAli b. al-Husayn al-Masʿudi (d. 956–57). Al-Masʿudi was one of the leading scholars of his time, who had a broad intellectual curiosity and wrote on a variety of topics. Because he consulted frequently with mariners and sailed in the Indian Ocean himself, his works shed light on the maritime realm of Oman and the region.[94] As he notes, "the sailors of Oman who sail on board this sea (the al-Habashi Sea) are Arabs, of the tribe of al-Azd."[95] These mariners were venturing south to obtain the trade items from East Africa, which included gold, iron, ambergris, leopard skins, tortoise shells, and ivory.

Reflections of this Arabian-East African commerce are evident in the archaeological record. Stone structures develop in East Africa during this period. Early mosques in Ras al-Mkumbuu and Chwaka illustrate Ibadi-style mihrabs and date to the tenth and eleventh centuries. These structures, along with Chinese and Indian pottery, illustrate the process of urbanization stimulated by increased trade with the Islamic world. In addition, there appear to be stronger links with both Persian culture and the Buyid economy, evinced by the emerging and debated "Shirazi" culture of East Africa in the eleventh century.

Al-Masʿudi's work also highlights the important luxuries trade taking place at the time in other Indo-West Pacific regions. He indicates the appropriate areas to locate spices such as pepper and details the process of making musk. Al-Masʿudi and other geographers highlight the importance of a variety of trade goods in India, including textiles, spices, aromatics, timbers, grains, and medicines. In addition, he mentions the presence of Omani merchants in the province of Saymur on the West Deccan coast, living within a larger Muslim merchant community of approximately 10,000 people, many of them immigrants from other parts of the Gulf.[96]

Al-Masʿudi addresses the fragmentation of the formerly direct route to China by the tenth century and describes a route taken by a merchant from Samarkand:

It is related that one of the merchants from the populace of Samarkand … left his country carrying many wares to Iraq, where he loaded up with goods from there. He [then] headed to Basra and sailed the seas until he came to the land of Oman. He then went to Kala, which is roughly halfway on the route to China. It is where the Omani and Sirafi Muslim ships end [their voyages] at this time and meet those coming from China in their ships. In the past it was different, as the ships of China came to the lands of Oman and Siraf as well as the coasts of Fars and Bahrayn, Ubulla and Basra, just as the ships of these different places just mentioned used to go there [to China].[97]



Figure 5: The ninth-century mosque in Shanga. Image courtesy of Mark Horton.

This passage illustrates that the maritime and land-based trade routes were in fact deeply intertwined with one another. The reference to Oman in this itinerary illustrates that it was integrated with this maritime Asian trade, connecting Central Asia, Southwest Asia, and Southeast Asia. This passage also indicates that the long-distance network direct from Basra to China was beginning to be partitioned into the Indian Ocean and Pacific spheres, with an overlap in Kalah.

One of the main economic debates concerns the degree to which trade in the western Indian Ocean shifted in about 1000 from the Gulf to the Red Sea as a result of the fall of the Buyid and ʿAbbasid states and the corresponding rise of the Fatimids in the Red Sea.[98] This shift coincides with larger trends, in which new maritime powers in the Indo-West Pacific, such as the Cholas in southern India and the Song in China, as well as the port-city of Aden in Yemen, all rose to the fore.[99] On a more regional level, the Siraf earthquakes in 978 and 1008 also had a significant impact, as Sirafi merchants started relocating south, establishing themselves in locations such as Qays, Sohar, Dhofar, and most likely East Africa.[100]

This reorientation to the Red Sea and the eastern Indian Ocean-South China Sea is definitely one of the main economic transitions that happens during 893–1250, but the assertion that a dramatic decline occurred in the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz in 1000 due to this shift is perhaps overstated. There is still evidence for long-distance and regional maritime trade in the eleventh century. Rougeulle, in her assessment of the archaeological evidence, states, "The ceramic studies show in particular that, after *ca*. 1000, the Gulf maritime networks still extended as far as India, China, and East Africa, and the Red Sea market only seems to become closed to Gulf traders."[101] There were continued connections between Oman and China and its markets, such as the embassy of Abu al-Qasim (*Ho-ka-shin*) from Sohar (*Mazun*) to China, paying tribute to the Song state in 1011.[102] This was part of the maritime commercial reorientation of the early Song, in which China became much more involved in maritime commerce in the Indo-West Pacific.

It seems more accurate to say that trade shifted to the southern Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. With the decline of the Buyids in the eleventh century, there was a realignment away from Siraf—which had been central to the Buyid economy under ʿAdud al-Dawla (r. 948–72)—to southern ports such as Qays and Hormuz under the Saljuqs. This transition ultimately incorporated the Omani littoral into these maritime city-state polities.

Fragmentation and Realignment Part II (1055–1250): The Saljuqs, the Nabhanids, Qays, and Hormuz

With the arrival of the Saljuqs in Oman, we see an alternative narrative emerge. This was part of a larger process by which Central Asian tribes migrated in significant groups throughout the heartlands of the Islamic world. There had been individually important Turkish actors and even states that had operated within an ʿAbbasid framework, such as the Ghaznavids prior to the Saljuqs or Turkish cavalry within Buyid armies, but the Saljuqs were the first Turkish tribe to sweep across Iran and Iraq and even portions of Anatolia as a coherent political conglomeration. This was the beginnings of a larger, long-term process, as significant portions of the Islamic world fell under the control of military states ruled by Central Asian populations, either as sultans, soldiers, or slave soldiers, who then negotiated a series of complex relationships with the religious elites to secure a degree of legitimacy.[103]

The Saljuqs were primarily a military state that promoted Sunnism in the face of the previous political expressions of Shiʿism, such as the Buyids and Fatimids. Their initial system of Turkish tribal organization quickly adopted Persianate systems of bureaucracy for rule. They were first led by two brothers, Toghril Beg (d. 1063) and Chaghri Beg (d. 1060), who established the Saljuq state, taking over much of Persia and Iraq in the mid-eleventh century. Chagri's son Alp Arslan (d. 1072) and his grandson Malikshah (r. 1073–92) ruled after them, working in conjunction with the powerful Persian minister (*wazīr*) Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092) to establish a strong state that expanded at the expense of the waning Buyid and Ghanzavid polities. Their power in turn waned in the twelfth century as the ʿAbbasid caliphate briefly reasserted itself and the western borders of the Saljuq state were challenged by Christian crusaders. In addition, further Central Asian challenges arose from the east such as the Qara-Khitai. After the Qara-Khitai defeated Sultan Sanjar in 1141, the Saljuqs relinquished control of Oman to the Nabhanids (see below).[104]

In Oman, the first Saljuq attack came by sea. ʿImad al-Din Qavurd Khan b. Chagri Beg (r. 1041–72), using ships supplied by the Amir of Hormuz, sent a force from Kirman and took control of Oman, including Sohar, in 1063.[105] Although this has been interpreted as "a break with the old Iranian political, ethnic, and economic order and the beginning of nearly one thousand years of Turkish hegemony and influence in the Gulf region,"[106] the Saljuq polity was in fact a mixture of multiple cultural elements that defy easy categorization. Although they

represented Turkish influences, there were also strong Persian elements to the Saljuq state. The Persian Saljuq administrator Nizam al-Mulk is the most prominent example of what has been termed "Persianization," a resurgence of Persian elements of bureaucracy and culture in this time period.[107] In addition, Saljuq rulers such as Qavurd Khan also relied heavily on Arab tribal forces to support his reign. Thus, the shift in the narrative in Oman from an "Arab" Imamate to "Turkish" and later "Persianate" forms of rule should be understood as part of a larger process, in which the Islamic world was incorporating a variety of cultural influences, including Arab, Persian, and Central Asian, within a multicultural Islamic context. Thus, these ethnic-state designations are relative rather than absolute terms. The Saljuqs were engaged in ruling the coasts of Oman using Turkish and Persian elements of a military state, but they also relied on Arab "tribal" actors, such as the Bani Nabhanids, and the rising state of Hormuz.

The Nabhanids were descended from the Azdi ʿAtik tribe, located primarily in the interior near Bahla and Hamra and the Batinah coast. They established a state that ruled parts of Oman for almost 500 years. However, their rulers were not Imams sanctioned by the Ibadi community, but rather kings (*mulūk*) and sultans. Unfortunately, very little remains of their activities in the historical record.[108] They most likely began the ascendancy when one Ibn Nabhan was established as governor of Sohar and surrounding regions by the Buyids after the fall of the Makramids. They apparently continued to prosper under the Saljuqs and established themselves as an independent polity once their overlords waned within the twelfth century. They are then referred to as "the sultans of Sohar" during their conflicts with Ibadi Imams. They controlled Rustaq and Nizwa until both cities were taken from them by Imam Khalil b. ʿUmar al-Yahmadi in the second half of the twelfth century.

The Nabhanids in the thirteenth century aligned themselves with the Hormuz-Qalhat maritime polity and continued to rule in the interior in the fourteenth century, when Ibn Battuta reportedly visited their ruler in Nizwa.[109] However, their history, as well as that of the Ibadi Imamate, is extremely opaque in the thirteenth and fourteenth century sources, and it is only at the beginning of the fifteenth century that we see evidence regarding the existence of the Nabhanids and an Imamate, that of Imam Malik b. al-Hawari (1406–1429), who fought against the Nabhanids during his reign.[110] Nonetheless, they were periodically important Omani political actors, in spite of the fact that external historical sources placed more emphasis on the emerging maritime states of Qays and Hormuz.

Qays

The island of Qays (Kish),[111] twelve miles from the Iranian coast, was known as a center for maritime raiding at the end of the eleventh century—what has been referred to as "a pirate hideout" by Piacentini—which developed into a relatively prosperous port that expanded outwards a century later with the fall of the Saljuqs. It was reported to have both Arab and Persian populations, with a particularly strong connection with Fars and its fading port city of Siraf, especially after an earthquake devastated Siraf in 978.[112] Originally under nominal control of the Buyids, Qays gradually established its own thalassocratic city-state, which spread throughout the eastern Arabian seaboard, taking control of Sohar and Bahrain, and—according to Ibn al-Athir—even attacking Basra around 1100.[113]

They also undertook naval campaigns in southern Arabia. For example, a Qays fleet attacked Aden in 1135. Two Jewish merchants, Madmun b. Japheth and Khalaf b. Isaac, describe the expedition in the Geniza letters, as does the thirteenth-century traveler Ibn Mujawir. A Qays fleet of fifteen ships with 700 men on board came into the anchorage and besieged the city for two months, until two ships owned by a prominent shipowner named Ramisht broke through and provided aid to the inhabitants. This forced the Qays fleet to return unsuccessful.[114] Al-Idrisi (d. 1165) indicated that the Omani coast was part of the Qays polity in the second half of the twelfth century, and the geographer Yaqut al-Rumi al-Hamawi (1179–1229), who was originally a Greek slave, noted in the first part of the thirteenth century that Qays "was the residence of the king of that sea and ruler of ʿUmān to whom belonged one-third of the income of Bahrayn."[115] He also noted that it was one of the centers for the lucrative trade with the Indian subcontinent, as well as China.[116] It was a major redistribution center for pearls and horses, redirecting these local commodities eastward in exchange for spices and textiles from India, and grains and textiles from Persia and Iraq.[117]

Qays was taken over by the Ghuzz leader Malik Dinar (r. 1187–95), and later by the Khwarazim-Shah, and periodically used as a base for attacks on the Omani coast by these polities. Qays established a certain degree of independence under the Qutlugh Khan polity before being taken over in 1230 by the Salghurid atabeg Abu Bakr b. Saʿd b. Zanji (d. 1260), who, with the assistance of the Hormuzi fleet, slaughtered the Qays royal family in the process.[118] With this act, Qays became increasingly incorporated within the al-Salghurid fold in Fars, and later the Mongolian Il-Khanid states. This island entrepôt reached its commercial peak under the rule of local *malik* Jamal al-

Din al-Tibi before declining with the fall of the Il-Khanids and being subsumed by the rising Hormuzi state.[119]

The Tibis were an important family in the final chapter of Qays' history. Malik al-Islam Jamal al-Din Ibrahim b. Muhammad al-Tibi (d. 1306), the governor of Fars, who also controlled Qays, was a powerful merchant who had commercial connections extending from the Mediterranean to China. His brother, ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Tibi, was a wazir to an Indian ruler (the king of Pandyas), providing a truly international family network of connections with the economically important al-Hind.[120]

Maritime raiding continued to be an essential part of the maritime economy of the Indian Ocean, and Qays is an excellent example of a state that utilized maritime raiding to control the seas. In the following account by Ibn Mujawir, the ruler of Qays sent some of his fleet to seize a horse valued at 1000 *mithqal* being transported by the king of Makran from Muscat to Persia. When one of the King's vassals heard it had been seized:

He took some pirate ships and turned them towards the landfalls of the Qaysi. He gave them instructions, "Every ship you see belonging to the lord of Qays, seize it by force!" So they seized that monsoon season twelve ships laden with all kinds of wares, gifts, rare presents, and wealth.[121]

This is an example of states using maritime raiding as part of an informal political contestation of control of the seas and the goods being transported upon it. According to al-Idrisi (d. 1165), Sohar's decline was due to the excessively predatory maritime raiding that Qays undertook against the city, and which forced Indian Ocean trade to move southwards. If this is true, it is a telling indication of the significance of such activity, in which trade routes were altered and the fortunes of a long-standing entrepôt laid low due to maritime raiding.[122]

Hormuz

Simultaneous with the rise of Qays, the port of Hormuz was also establishing itself as an important maritime polity. The old port of Hormuz on the mainland Iranian coast, also known as Old Hormuz, had existed as a small port from at least the first century and continued to participate in trade during the Early Islamic and ʿAbbasid periods. During this time, it had served principally as a conduit for trade with Kirman, which was overshadowed by Siraf to the north.

However, in the Middle Islamic period, Hormuz rose from a port of minor importance to the center of an expansive maritime merchant state that spanned the coasts of eastern Arabia and the Iranian mainland. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, it, along with Qays, increased in importance, becoming the maritime conduit for first the Buyid and later the Saljuq polities invading the Omani coast. It was also an important commercial outlet for goods moving to and from the eastern provinces of the Saljuq state into the Indian Ocean.[123]

Under the Saljuqs, it became increasingly connected both with the Omani coast, as well as the port of Tiz in the Kij-u-Makran region to the east. With the fall of the Saljuqs, Hormuz and Qays assisted other Central Asian invaders, such as the Ghuzz under Malik Dinar (r. 1187–95), the Khawarizm-Shah, and the Salghurids in Fars (1148–1270), in storming the shores of Oman.[124] Vosoughi has highlighted this tendency of the amirs of Hormuz during this period to acquiesce to the demands of other states in the region in order to survive.[125]

Throughout this period, there was a deep rivalry between Qays and Hormuz, that sometimes turned violent. For example, Hormuz joined Atabeg Abu Bakr b. Saʿd Zangi's previously mentioned attack against Qays in 1229–30, causing considerable damage. Hormuz will be discussed in more depth in the discussion of the following period, but its genesis as an important thalossocratic state was initiated in this period of heightened competition with Qays and the influx of Central Asian states.

The Flow of Goods and People: 1055–1250

In the Arabian Gulf, the shift of trade to the south, initiated in the beginning of the eleventh century, became more pronounced as more goods flowed southwards around the Arabian Peninsula to Yemen and Egypt, or to Qays and Hormuz. The Islamic networks of trade still existed, but the nodes and routes shifted in the process. As Wilkinson noted, the commercially significant maritime network of the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, which between 700 and 1050 constituted the "trilogy of Obollah–Siraf–Sohar" re-aligned itself into "the triangle of Hormuz, Qalhat, and Tiz on the Makran coast."[126] During this transitional era, accurate evidence is difficult to ascertain, but Oman appears to have declined slightly in this period, as it was incorporated within the Saljuq and later the Qays economies, and reduced to serving in a tributary role.

This was part of a larger global economic transformation as the Song Chinese, North African, and European economies grew stronger and the economic heart of the old Abbasid Caliphate shifted eastwards to Persia and Central Asia. The centers for maritime trade in the northern part of the Gulf, such as Siraf and Ubulla,




Figure 6: The "trilogy of Obollah (Uballah)-Siraf-Sohar." Image courtesy of Alessandro Ghidoni.

shifted southwards to Qays and Hormuz as trade with the Iranian mainland became more important and commerce with Syria and Asia Minor decreased.[127] During the decline of Siraf and a period of heavy maritime raiding in the eleventh century, the merchant communities of Fars also moved south to Qays, Hormuz, and the Omani seaboard, and other Gulf communities moved south to East Africa, often referred to as "Shirazi" emigrants.[128] Vosoughi claims that merchant communities from Sohar shifted to Hormuz in the second half of the eleventh century.[129] In addition, Andre Wink contends that the Saljuqs redirected the India trade that had previously traveled up the Arabian Gulf to Siraf and al-Ubulla through Qays and Hormuz in an effort to compete with the Fatimid Red Sea trade. The Buyid and Saljuq promotion of trade routes on the Iranian mainland and the Omani coast and in Makran and Kirman, especially under Qavurd Khan, further stimulated a shift in trade to these shores at the expense of the previous Basran-Sohar Azdi mercantile networks.[130] In addition, seaborne traffic increased to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean during the reign of the Fatimids (969–1171) and Ayyubids (1171–1250), stimulating the maritime economy of Aden and southern Arabia in the process. Thus, the decline of the ʿAbbasid state, the fading of Siraf, and the political reorientation toward the Iranian mainland and North Africa all contributed to this translocation of maritime trade.

Commerce continued in the Indo-West Pacific region, especially during the early Song state, which was actively promoting maritime commerce in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Sohar, Mirbat, and the Saljuq court all sent tributes to the Song Empire in China in the second half of the eleventh century. In 1072, the ambassador Hashim ʿAbd Allah from Sohar gave the Chinese state frankincense, ambergris, dates, coral, pearls, and rhinoceros horn. Dhofar also initiated embassies with the Song Empire.[131] During this period, mosques were built in Quan-zhou, the new center of Song maritime trade.




Figure 7: Sewn planks from a thirteenth-century reconstruction. Image courtesy of the author.

The strong relationship between the Omani and Indian economies continued, as Qays and Hormuz exported horses to the western and southeastern coasts of India. Mixed-origin Muslim populations, such as the Mappilas, as well as foreign Muslim traders (*pardesi*) gradually emerged as a significant seagoing merchant class in western India. Arab and Persian merchants largely controlled the transit trade with the Hindu Caulukyas state of Anahilvada (941–1297) in Gujarat.[132] South Arabian populations, in particular from the Hadramawt and Aden, also moved to Malabar at this time, strengthening the southern Red Sea route in the process.

Trade also continued with East Africa. In particular, there was a shift towards commercial routes with southern Arabia, especially with Aden. Although the Omani presence in the archaeological record is limited, the geographer al-Idrisi noted that: "the Zanj of the East African Coast have no ships to voyage in, but use vessels from Oman and other countries which sail to the islands of Zanj which depend on the Indies."[133] In addition, letters from the Ibadi scholar al-ʿAwtabi to ʿAli b. ʿAli and Hasan b. ʿAli in Kilwa in the beginning of the twelfth century suggest that Ibadi networks were still active in East Africa at the time.[134]

All of this commercial activity continued to engender considerable demographic mobility. The Middle Islamic period, 1000–1500, in general is incredibly important for Muslim interaction in the Indian Ocean. The dominant narratives of the spread of Islam highlight the initial *futūh* as Islam, at least in its political manifestations, expanded rapidly from a small Meccan phenomenon to a religious force from Spain to Central Asia. While this process of rapid expansion is historically relevant for the history of Islam, the more gradual and complex spread of Islam throughout the Indo-West Pacific littoral had equally profound demographic implications. This littoral expansion was initiated in the Early Islamic period, but really came to fruition in the Middle Islamic period as large portions of East Africa, the Indian littoral, and Southeast Asia converted to Islam. Today, the largest population of Muslims lives in Southeast and South Asia—rather than the Middle East.[135]

This conversion was a complex and protracted process, involving the Central Asian land-based migrations mentioned above, as well as Southwest Asian, African, and South Asian maritime movements. Arab and Persian Muslim merchants had established themselves in communities along the Indo-West Pacific littoral from the seventh through tenth centuries, with the eventual consequence of individual and communal religious conversions within local populations. Political conversions to Islam, especially in the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries, accelerated this process.[136] By the end of the Middle Islamic period (c. 1500), large portions of the Indo-West Pacific littoral had become part of the Islamic world.[137]

The period between 1050 and 1250 can thus be viewed as an intermediate phase from the initial establishment of Muslim communities to the large-scale conversion of significant portions of the Indian Ocean littoral. Evidence from the twelfth century also points to a significant Islamization of East Africa and the Maldives.[138] In India, Muslim communities developed mainly along the coasts. The Muslim population in Gujarat, for example, grew under the Caulukya ruler Siddharaja (d. 1143). By the thirteenth century, Andre Forbes argues that South Arabian migrations to India, East Africa, and Southeast Asia had become truly significant.[139]

A new system: Hormuz-Qalhat and Al-Baleed-Yemen and the Indian Ocean: 1250–1507

The whole world is a ring and Ormuz is the stone thereof.[140]

Between 1250 and 1507, patterns of trade shifted towards the flourishing entrepôts of Hormuz and Qalhat, while the once-prosperous ports of Sohar and Siraf withered. With the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century, an increasingly global series of economic networks emerged that connected the Indian Ocean economy via land routes with Central Asia and Europe, and a rich western Indian Ocean economy reemerged. In terms of the larger Indo-West Pacific, long-distance maritime trade became increasingly segmented and more culturally diverse, especially given the increased trade with South and Southeast Asia. The maritime economies of the Gulf of Oman and southern Arabia became further intertwined with that of India as the horse trade in particular further bound them together and Turco-Perso-Arab migrations continued along the Indian Ocean littoral. Hormuz and Qalhat were central hubs in this new system. The Kingdom of Hormuz established itself as a regional maritime power in the thirteenth century, strove to dominate its rivals in Qays, and strengthened its connections with the Omani littoral. It was able to establish complementary relationships with the Central Asian states, such as the Qutlugh-Khanids in Kirman, providing maritime resources and naval forces to these otherwise terrestrial polities but still managing to retain a degree of independence in the process.[141]

In the thirteenth century, the Mongol invasions had a dramatic impact on Islamic societies, as well as on most of the Eurasian landmass. The Central and East Asian Mongol and Turkish tribal confederations built

by Chingiz Khan rolled westwards across the Asian continent, taking the Qara-Khitai empire of Central Asia (1218), Transoxiana, parts of Persia (1219–23), and Chin (1234) and later Song China (1279). Chingiz Khan's grandson Hülegü (d. 1265) conquered the rest of Persia, Iraq, and parts of Syria in the 1250s, and took Baghdad in 1258—killing 200,000 and ending the ʿAbbasid caliphate once and for all. These marauding nomadic populations eventually integrated themselves in the societies they invaded, and the successive Mongol rulers established the Il-Khanid dynasty, an originally Mongol Buddhist-Shamanist state, which became Persianized and Islamized (1295) by the end of the thirteenth century.[142] The process of Mongol expansion and rule has been called "a disaster of great fascination" because of its transformative effects on the Islamic world.[143]

The ruler of Hormuz at the time of the Hülegü invasions was Rukn al-Din Mahmud al-Qalhati (1242–1278), who shifted the focus of Hormuz south during this period. In response to the increasing Central Asian invasions, he fortified Old Hormuz and the Omani coastline, further developed the port city of Qalhat that gave him his name, and assembled an army. Relying on maritime resources largely lacking to Central Asian invaders, he used his fleet aggressively and took control of islands in the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. He also attacked Qays to the west and Dhofar in southern Oman. In addition, he tried to expand his influence in the hinterlands of Oman by unsuccessfully attempting to ally himself with the Nabhanids and conducting campaigns in the interior.[144]

This policy of defensive action against the Central Asian marauders was further developed by another ruler of Hormuz, Baha' al-Din Ayaz (r. 1291–1311), a Turkish ex-slave who had been the governor of Qalhat. However, he took the defense of the port one step further. After beating back an attack by a combined al-Qays-Il-Khanid force in 1296, Ayaz shifted the port from Old Hormuz on the Iranian mainland to the barren island of Jarun, thus creating "New Hormuz" or Jarun-Hormuz.[145] This move protected the Hormuz capital from land-based attacks by Central Asians for the next two centuries and further emphasized the thalossocratic dimensions of this state.

In the beginning of the fourteenth century, the power of the Mongol Il-Khanid state was fading, as were the fortunes of Qays, intertwined as it was with Il-Khanid power structures. The Hormuzi king Qutb al-Din Tahamtan (r. 1318–1348) took advantage of the situation and invaded Qays in the third decade of the fourteenth century, effectively eliminating his closest maritime threat. This devastating invasion ended the rivalry between the two and ushered in nearly two centuries of Hormuz's maritime hegemony in the region.[146] Qays faded quickly from the maritime economy after this attack. According to one chronicler, "it had once that seaborne trade that Harmuz now has, but all that is lost in the wars, and scarce can it keep its own name."[147] Evidence of this decline can be seen in the archaeological record. Williamson, for example, notes the paucity of blue and white porcelain sherds from 1350–1400 in Qays, indicating that this once-dynamic port city was no longer a major Indo-West Pacific entrepôt.[148]

With its main rival removed, Hormuz expanded its control further along the littoral, adding Bahrain, with its lucrative pearl industry, and the coastal territories of al-Fars and Moghistan to its Omani-Hormuz maritime domains. By the fifteenth century, Hormuz was the center of a maritime mercantile state that extended throughout significant segments of the Omani Gulf and Makran coasts. It benefited from the Timurids' investment in protecting and maintaining the land-based commercial networks of Euro-Asia.[149] While Hormuz was nominally dependent upon the Timurid and Turkish dynasties controlling the Iranian mainland to the north, it was in fact led by local rulers, King Sayf al-Din and then King Fahr al-Din Turanshah II, who between them ruled for over half of the century (1417–1470).[150]

Although they were commercially prosperous in the fifteenth century, this did not always translate into political stability, as there were intermittent internecine squabbles and a divisive civil war. The Hormuzi kings jealously guarded against alternative claims to the throne, reportedly blinding all potential contenders and imprisoning them to prevent internal dissension.[151] By the time the Portuguese arrived in 1507, dynastic and ethnic squabbles had seriously weakened the Hormuzi state, forcing it into an increasingly tributary relationship with the Portuguese as the sixteenth century progressed.

Although the Hormuzi state is often classified as Persian or Iranian because of its location, it was ethnically and geographically diverse and included as much eastern Arabian territory as it did on the Iranian mainland. There was a considerable exchange between the Omani and Persian coasts, which could reasonably be regarded as a single interactive geographical forelands region, as connected with one another as with the hinterlands that surrounded them. The royal family maintained a delicate balance of power between their Arab and Persian subjects, as well as various Central Asian invaders, such as the Timurid, Qara-Qoyunlu, and Aq-Qoyunlu states—each of which desired to incorporate Hormuzi maritime wealth into their domains.[152] They intermarried with important Omani families, such as when the Hormuzi King Salghur Shah I (1475–1505), who took over after a protracted civil war following the death of Turanshah

II, married the daughter of the Nabhani ruler Sulayman b. Sulayman.[153] One of its most famous rulers, Ayaz, was originally a Turkish slave soldier. An ethnically separate community, Abbysinian slave soldiers, comprised the royal guard, and Central Asian and Arab tribal populations made up much of their army.

The key to their lucrative maritime system was their ability to coerce ships to visit key ports, such as Hormuz and Qalhat. Marco Polo's comments reveal that the key factor to this maritime hegemony was Qalhat's strategic location:

The city stands at the mouth or entrance of the Gulf of Kalhat, so that no ship can enter or leave the gulf except by leave of the ruler. The malik of the city thus has a powerful hold over the sultan of Kerman, to whom he is subject. For some time the Sultan imposes some duty on the malik of Hormuz or one of his brothers, and they refuse to pay it, and the sultan sends an army to enforce payment. At that time they leave Hormuz and take ship and cross over to Kalhat and stay there and do not let a single ship pass. This means a great loss to the Sultan, who is accordingly obliged to make peace with the malik and moderate his demand for money.[154]



Figure 8: The Middle Islamic ports. Image courtesy of Alessandro Ghidoni.

Hormuz's ships patrolled the Arabian Sea and the mouth of the Gulf, often seizing ships headed to other ports, such as the ten heavily-laden merchant ships bound for Qays that the Hormuzi fleet reportedly captured in the beginning of the fourteenth century.[155] The chronicle *Shahnama-yi Turanshahi* also records that King Qutb al-Din during his exile in Qalhat in 1345 seized ships from India to obtain the funds necessary to help him retake the throne: "the port (Qalhat) gained much from his presence, for he detained there the ships bound from India to Harmuz."[156] The dramatic decline of rival ports such as Qays and Sohar by the fourteenth century is evidence of the success of such a strategy.

The Flow of Goods and People: 1250–1507

The massive Mongol migrations across Asia also undoubtedly stimulated Hormuz's economy, and the state the Mongols created in Southwest Asia—the Il-Khanid dynasty—actively promoted maritime relationships with East and Southeast Asia. Janet Abu-Lughod has argued that there was a significant shift in the mid-thirteenth century as the region became more directly connected with the expanding, multipolar economic world system. The result was a surplus of economic wealth and a "cultural efflorescence" between 1250 and 1350. She contends that the dramatic increase in wealth and economic integration in the thirteenth century, from Europe to China, constituted a "turning point" in world history.[157]

Although Abu-Lughod has focused much attention on the decline of the world economy in the latter half of the fourteenth century due to the collapse of the Mongolian international system and the outbreak of the bubonic plague, other scholars have emphasized the prosperity of the period in the Indian Ocean immediately following these events. As McPherson points out:

Undoubtedly the zenith of traditional indigenous maritime trading activity across the Indian Ocean was in what Ashin Das Gupta has described as the 'high medieval period' between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. It was a period during which Middle Eastern merchants (Arabs, Persians, Egyptians and Jews) along with Muslim and Hindu merchants from South Asia—particularly from the ports of Gujarat and the Malabar coast—dominated the sea traffic of the western Indian Ocean. Eastwards from South Asia Muslim and Hindu merchants from South Asia, along with smaller numbers of Arab and Persian merchants, dominated the sealanes to and from Southeast Asia where they linked in with flourishing Chinese and Javanese merchant communities.[158]

The Hormuzi-Omani maritime economy was an essential part of both the Mongolian "world system" and later Das Gupta's "high medieval" maritime economy. With its




Figure 9: The middle Islamic anchor at Qalhat. Image courtesy of Tom Vosmer.

fleet patrolling the waters of the Arabian Sea and Arabian Gulf, Hormuz redirected maritime traffic to itself and its sister ports Qalhat and Tiz. The historian Qazi ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Nimdihi writes:

From all seaports such as Mecca, Jidda, Aden, Sofala, Yemen, China, Europe, Calicut, and Bengal they came by sea and brought superior merchandise from everywhere to there, and they brought valuable goods from the cities of Fars, Iraq, and Khurasan to that place.[159]

The diversity of the goods passing through this entrepôt was impressive. Duarte Barbosa, the Portuguese chronicler who witnessed the Hormuz economy in the early sixteenth century, commented that, in addition to horses, it had textiles such as cotton and silk; metals like gold, copper, and iron; gems, ivory, and pearls; foodstuffs such as rice, fruit, and dates; and a particularly wide variety of spices.[160] The customs duty on maritime goods was 10% and 5% for goods from land routes—all of which added considerable profits to state coffers.[161]

But the Hormuzi polity also included several other ports connected to its political and economic structures. As we have seen, Qalhat was the strategic "cornerstone" of this system, but smaller ports such as Muscat, Sur, Tiwi, and Julfar also became more prominent. Al-Baleed, too, flourished in southern Oman, although it remained independent from the Hormuz-Qalhat polity.

Qalhat

Qalhat emerged in this era as a central port of the maritime state of Hormuz. Pre-Islamic graves attest to the early settlement of Qalhat, and the town is often mentioned as the site of Malik b. Fahm's expulsion of the Persians during the Sasanian period. But the majority of the archaeological evidence indicates that the city underwent substantial growth in the twelfth through fifteenth centuries as a result of having become a southern Ibadi port for the Hormuzi maritime economy.[162] The family that founded the Hormuz dynasty was reportedly originally from Qalhat, establishing early connections between the two port cities. Qalhat became a place for royal family members to establish themselves in promising careers, as well as a place of refuge for



Figure 10: An assortment of ceramics found at Qalhat: a) Probably Persian, 15th–16th century; b) Probably Persian sgraffito, 11th–13th century; c) Julfar ware, 14th–17th century; d) Probably Persian, 15th–16th century; e) Persian sgraffito, 11th–13 century; f) most likely Julfar ware, 14th–17th century; g) Celadon, perhaps Longquan, 13th century; h) Celadon, probably Sawankhalok Thai, 16th century; i) most likely Chinese, blue and white; and j) incised buff ware, probably Hormuzi, Late Islamic period. Image and identifications courtesy of Tom Vosmer.

exiled Hormuzi contenders to the throne, such as Qutb al-Din mentioned above.[163] Marco Polo's comments above emphasize that Qalhat was strategically essential for the prosperity and stability of the Hormuzi maritime complex.

The economies of Qalhat and Hormuz were strongly dependent on maritime trade. A significant portion of this seaborne commerce depended on the horse trade. The horse trade had always been a part of Oman's maritime activity, but it flourished in this period because of the increased demand for horses to serve in the cavalry units of Indian polities, such as the Vijayanagar and the Bahmanids. Marco Polo describes the demand for horses in Kerala in the thirteenth century, as well as their high attrition rate:

No horses are being bred in this country, the king and his three royal brothers expend large sums of money annually in the purchase of them from merchants who carry them thither for sale, and become rich by the traffic. They import as many as five thousand at a time and for each of them, obtain five hundred saggi of gold, being equal to one hundred marks of silver. At the end of the year, perhaps not three hundred of these remain alive, and thus the necessity is occasioned for replacing them.[164]

Horses were being sourced from different areas of West Asia. In the Arabian Peninsula, they were being transported from islands such as Dahlak or the mountains and deserts of the interior to ports such as al-Balid, Aden, Qalhat, and Hormuz. In Qalhat, the horses were brought from Quriyat as well as from the immediate hinterlands. They were loaded onto ships that sailed throughout the Indian Ocean, but especially to India.[165]

However, commerce was not limited to horses alone. Terrestrial soundings from the 2003 survey of Qalhat found pottery from Middle and Recent Islamic periods, originating from Ming and Yuan China, imitation celadon from Southeast Asia, turquoise Persian ware, Yemeni mustard ware, and incised Hormuz ware, as well as a variety of Indian ware.[166] Although the pottery provides evidence of trade throughout the Indo-West Pacific, the majority of the ceramics indicate a strong trade with India in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. However, local ceramics eventually outnumber even the Indian wares in the fifteenth century, suggesting that a thriv-



Figure 11: Sewn timbers found at the archaeological site of al-Baleed. Image courtesy of Tom Vosmer.

ing local trade arose in this period to complement its long-distance counterpart.[167] Qalhat apparently declined in the last decades of the fifteenth century, most likely due to an earthquake, and Muscat ultimately took over its role as the primary port on the Omani littoral in the sixteenth century.

In this period, other ports, including Muscat, prospered. Muscat became an increasingly important port in the Hormuz-Omani maritime economy, growing from a watering stop on the way to China, to a prominent port in its own right. By the fifteenth century, according to the navigator Ahmad b. Majid, "Muscat is the port of Oman where year by year the ships load up with men, fruit and horses and they sell in it cloth, vegetable oils and new slaves and grain and all ships head for it."[168] Sohar, which according to Abu Fida' (d. 1331) was in ruins in the thirteenth century, had also reestablished itself as a small secondary port in the Hormuz-Qalhat system by the fifteenth century.[169] Other towns along the Arabian littoral, such as Quriyat, Tiwi, Khawr Fakkan, and Julfar, provided horses, dried fish, and agricultural produce in this period, growing apace as the Hormuzi economy blossomed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.[170] In addition, Julfar became a center for the distribution of pearls to Hormuz.[171]

Al-Baleed/Zufar

Although it was mostly outside of Hormuzi-Qalhati control, this port deserves mention, as al-Baleed became a prosperous port in southern Oman in this period. Alternatively referred to as Zufar and al-Mansur in the Arabic literature, it was a contested space in the thirteenth century, as both Yemeni and Hormuzi powers vied to control its trade. Hadrami Habudi forces attacked it in 1221 and established a new city of al-Baleed (Mansura) once it had razed the previous one. In approximately 1265, a Hormuzi maritime expedition led by Mahmud al-Qalhati pillaged Dhofar and then returned to Qalhat.[172] Another al-Habudi leader, Salim b. Idris, then took over Dhofar in 1271, and seven years later, it was captured by the Rasulid dynasty of Aden.[173]

Ibn Mujawir, Marco Polo, and Ibn Battuta all comment on its favorable maritime trade. It had held a significant role in commerce in the prior periods, but in the thirteenth century, there appears to have been a significant amount of growth. An increase in Indian Red Polished Ware was found in Phase II (1100–1350), as was a small assemblage of Southeast Asian and Chinese celadon. The following phase (1250–1500) saw the emergence of other ceramic types, such as Iranian Frit Blue ware and Chinese blue and white.[174]

The development of the port was partially driven by three essential large-scale factors. First, the unique role that the region played in the frankincense trade ensured its economic importance. Second, the shift of maritime trade from the Arabian Gulf to the Red Sea in the Middle Islamic period favored the growth of this southern port as it integrated into a growing Yemeni commercial network centered in Aden. Third, its participation in the growing horse trade that was fueling the economies of Qalhat and Hormuz provided it with a second important export.

The importance of frankincense was a long-term economic reality in the region, which boasted the finest and most desired frankincense in the world. The demand for this exotic product ebbed and flowed according to the historical contingencies of each era, but it never completely died away. It is apparent that frankincense was an essential part of the luxuries trade that fueled the economic growth at the height of the Abbasid period, albeit in a localized and diffused system of distribution. However, in the Middle Islamic period, the trade appears to have become centralized in the the ports of Shihr, al-Balid, and Mirbat. Twelfth-century records indicate that frankincense imports to Song China were in the order of fifty to seventy metric tons per year from the Dhofar region.[175] Thus, although the direct sailing routes from the Arabian Gulf to China that were so prominent in the literature of the previous period no longer existed, trade continued through a series of intermediary maritime networks. The famous voyages of Zheng Ho in the first three decades of the fifteenth century, including four visits to Hormuz, as well as increased trade connections with Islamicized Southeast Asian states, kept Southwest Asia connected to Southeast and East Asia.

Hormuz-Qalhat Trade in the Indo-West Pacific

There was also a rise in commercial trade between Hormuz, Qalhat, and East Africa. The prominent port-town of Kilwa reached its peak (1250–1330) during the first part of the Hormuzi era. During his visit there, Ibn Battuta stated: "Kilwa is one of the finest and most substantially built towns."[176] The Kilwa chronicle outlines the establishment of the Nabahina dynasty in Pate in this period,



Figure 12: The Kilwa domed mosque. Image courtesy of Mark Horton.

as Omani members of the Nabhanids migrated south and established an Omani-East African polity that was to last until the nineteenth century.[177] There was a decline in Kilwa after 1350, but other sites, such as Tumbatu, Pate, and Songo Mnara, flourished, and there was a string of almost forty trading towns along the East African littoral in the fifteenth century.[178] The increased presence of longquan and monocrome ware in these East African sites suggests that Hormuz-Qalhat maritime trade increased in importance while that of Aden's declined in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.[179]

Although the other maritime trade was significant, Hormuz's strongest long-distance trading partner appears to have been India. As McPherson and Da Gupta noted above, the majority of maritime trade in India, as well as in the Indian Ocean, was conducted by foreign Muslim merchants (*pardesi*) from Arabia and Persia, as well as Hindu Gujarati Banyans, Muslim Keralan Mappilas, and the Hindu Chettis of the Coromandel coast. The Mappilas were the descendants of previous Arab-Persian migrations to western Indian coasts, and Indo-Arab and Indo-Persian communities that emphasized their Arab ancestry.[180] The dominance of the horse trade has been noted, as well as the fact that over 70% of the pottery remains of thirteenth-fourteenth century layers of Qalhat were of Indian origin.[181] Hormuz became a significant center for Indian Hindu merchants, who lived in the city, practiced Hinduism, and were responsible for protecting a population of holy cows roaming the streets.[182] Figueroa estimated that 1,100 of the approximately 3,000 households in Hormuz were either Indian Christians or Hindus (*kāfir*).[183]

The Hormuz-Qalhat system incorporated the incredibly rich diversity of Indo-West Pacific merchant communities within its borders. Islamic trading networks had become increasingly diversified, as initial trade networks established by Arab and Persian merchants expanded with the conversion of significant portions of the littoral communities in the Indian Ocean. This diversity is vividly illustrated by al-Samarkandi's description of Hormuz.

Hormuz, which they call Jarun, is a port in the midst of the sea, "with no equal on the face of the earth." Merchants from the seven climes—Egypt, Syria, Anatolia, Azerbaijan, Arabia and Persian Iraq, Fars, Khurāsan, Transoxiana, Turkistan, the Qïpchaq Steppe, the Qalmaq regions and all of the lands of the Orient, China, and Khan Baliq—all come to that port, and seafaring men, from Indo-China, Java, Bengal, Ceylon, the cities of Zirbad [Malaysia], Tennaserim, Sumatra, Siam and the Maldive Islands to the realm of Malibar, Abyssinia and Zanzibar, the ports of Vijayanagar, Gulbarga, Gujarat and Cambay, the coast of the Arabian peninsula to Aden, Jiddah and Yanbu', bring to that town precious and rare commodities which are made glittering by the sun, moon and clouds and which can be transported across the sea. Travelers from everywhere in the world come there, and everything they bring for exchange and for what they want can be found without much search in that town.[184]

If one contrasts this list with the more monotheistic and local pluralities evident in the main entrepôt of ninth-century Sohar, with its Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian traders and Hindu mercenaries, it is apparent that this maritime trade had become considerably more pluralistic by the fifteenth century, expanding to "the seven climes" mentioned by Samarqandi. The Islamic networks had grown, incorporating various Central Asian populations and more traders from East Africa, the Bay of Bengal, and the Southeast Asian mainland, as well as the Indo-West Pacific archipelagos, such as Indonesia. This is a direct reflection of the cultural diversification of maritime Muslim networks in the Indo-West Pacific, as more communities became involved in sailing and trading within multiple Islamic maritime economies. And in the sixteenth century, one more layer—that of the Portuguese—added another shade to this rich and vibrant western Indian Ocean mosaic.

Conclusion

Oman, during the centuries between 630 and 1507, experienced major changes as it first became part of the Islamic world and then became increasingly connected to the wider horizons of the Indo-West Pacific. Using naval expeditions, maritime raiding, and even commercial coercion, a variety of states from the coast, the hinterlands, the forelands, and beyond all vied to control the wealth derived from Oman's maritime commerce. Goods, such as copper, frankincense, dates, dried fish, and horses, were loaded onto ships, which sailed along the monsoonal routes of the Indo-West Pacific and returned with luxuries, such as spices, gems, pearls, and gold; and bulk goods, such as grains, metals, and timber. More importantly, these ships carried people and all the cultural richness and complexity that came with them, integrating Arab, Persian, East African, Turkish, and Indian populations within the shores of Oman.

Notes

1 Anonymous, *Ta'rikh Ahl ʿUman*, ed. Saʿid ʿAbd al-Fattah ʿAshur (Muscat: Ministry of Heritage and Culture, 2005); Sirhan b. Saʿid b. Sirhan al-Izkawi, *Kashf al-Ghumma al-Jamiʿ fi Akhbar al-Umma*, ed. Muhammad Habib Salih and Mahmud b. Mubarak al-Salimi (Muscat: Ministry of Heritage and Culture, 2013); idem, *Annals of Oman to 1728*, trans. E. C. Ross, (New York: Oleander Press, 1984); Humayd b. Muhammad b. Ruzayq, *al-Fath al-Mubin fi Sirat al-Sadat al-Al Bu Saʿidiyin* (Muscat: Ministry of Heritage and Culture, 1983); idem, *History of the Imâms and Seyyids of ʿOmân*, trans. G. P. Badger (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1871); Nur al-Din ʿAbd Allah b. Humayd al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan bi-Sirat Ahl ʿUman* (Muscat: Maktabat al-Istiqama, 2013). The majority of English scholarship, with the significant exception of J. C. Wilkinson, has primarily relied on *Kashf al-Ghumma* and *Fath al-Mubin*, largely due to their translation by Ross and Badger into English. *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan* is considered by Wilkinson to be the most authoritative of these works, yet has not been translated into English. See Isam al-Rawas, *Oman in Early Islamic History* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2000), 4–19, for a summary of these Omani historical sources.

2 Abu al-Mundhir Salama b. Muslim al-ʿAwtabi, *al-Ansab,* ed. Muhammad Ihsan al-Nas (Muscat: Ministry of National Heritage and Culture, 2006). The authorship of this work has been debated, and both Wilkinson and Hassan Naboodah have argued that it was written by someone else at an earlier date, either Salmah b. Muslim (Wilkinson) or an anonymous author (Naboodah). The author is therefore often referred to as pseudo-al-ʿAwtabi, but for this chapter, it will be cited as al-ʿAwtabi, with an understanding that the authorship has been questioned. J. C. Wilkinson, "Bio-bibliographical Background to the Crisis Period in the Ibadi Imamate of Oman," *Arabian Studies* 3 (1976): 153; Hassan Naboodah, Kitab al-Ansab lil-al-ʿAwtabi: Iskalat fi al-Nasba wal- Taʿalif," *Majallat Dirasat al-Khalij wal-Jazirat al-ʿArabiyya* 32 (2006): 141–67; Brian Ulrich, "The Azd migrations reconsidered," *Proceedings of the Seminar of Arabian Studies* 38 (2008): 312.

3 Abu Jabir Muhammad b. Jaʿfar al-Izkawi, *al-Jamiʿ* (Muscat: Ministry of Heritage and Culture, 1981–1995); Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Kindi, *al-Musannaf*, vol. 18 (Muscat: Ministry of Heritage and Culture, 1983). For a complete listing and discussion of the *siyar* literature, see Abdulrahman al-Salimi, "The Omani siyar as a literary genre and its role in the political evolution and doctrinal development of Eastern Ibadism, with special reference to the epistles of Khwarizm, Khurasan and Mansura," (PhD diss., Durham University, 2001).

4 Abu Jaʿfar Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari, *Ta'rikh al-Rusul wa-l-Muluk*, ed. M. J. de Goeje et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1879–1901); Abu al-ʿAbbas Ahmad b. Yahya al-Baladhuri, *Kitab Futuh al-Buldan*, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden: Brill, 1866); idem, *The Origins of the Islamic State*, trans. Philip Khuri Hitti (New York and London: Columbia University, 1916); ʿAli ʿIzz al-Din Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil fi al-Ta'rikh* (Cairo: Idarat al-Tibaʿa al-Muniriyah, 1929–30/Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1987): Abu Zayd ʿAbd al-Rahman b. Muhammad b. Khaldun, *Al-Muqaddima* (Casablanca: Bayt al-Funun wal-ʿUlum wal-Adab, 2005); idem, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, by Ibn Khaldun*, trans. Franz Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958).

5 Abu al-Qasim ʿUbayd Allah b. ʿAbd Allah b. Khurdadhbih, *Kitab al-Masalik wal-Mamalik* (Leiden: Brill, 1891), with a partial English translation of *Kitab al-Masalik wal-Mamalik* in S. Maqbul Ahmad, *Arab Classical Accounts of India and China* (Calcutta: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1989); Abu Zayd al-Sirafi, *Two Arabic Travel Books: Accounts of China and India*, trans. Tim Mackintosh-Smith (New York and London: New York University Press, 2014), 31 (both Arabic text and English translation): Abu al-Hasan ʿAli b. al-Husayn al-Masʿudi, *Muruj al-Dhahab wa Maʿadin al-Jawhar*, ed. Charles Pellat (Beirut: Publications de l'Université Libanaise, 1965); idem, *Les Prairies d'Or*, trans. Charles Pellat et al. (Paris: Société Asiatique, 1962); Shams al-Din Abu ʿAbd Allah Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Muqaddasi, *Kitab Ahsan al-Taqasim fi Maʿrifat al-Aqalim* (Leiden: Brill, 1877); idem, *The Best Divisions for Knowledge of the Regions*, trans. Basil Anthony Collins (Reading, U.K.: Garnet, 1994); Muhammad Abu al-Qasim b. Hawqal, *Kitab Surat al-Ard*, (Beirut: Maktabat al-Haya, 1992); Yaqut al-Hamawi, *Muʿjam al-Buldan/Jacut's Geographisches Wörterbuch*, 4 vols., ed. Ferdinand Wüstenfeld (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1869); Abu ʿAbd Allah Muhammad al-Idrisi, *Nuzhat al-mushtaq fi dhikr al-amṣar wa-al-aqṭar wa-al-buldan wa-al-juzur wa-al-madaʿin wa-al-afaq* (Baghdad: 1971); idem, *Geographie d'Edrisi*, 2 vols., ed. A. Jaubert (Paris: 1836–40).

6 Abu Bakr b. Muhammad b. Masʿud b. ʿAli b. Ahmad Ibn al-Mujawir, *Ta'rikh al-Mustabsir*, ed. Oscar Löfgren, 2 volumes (Leiden: Brill, 1951–4); idem, *A Traveller in Thirteenth-Century Arabia*, trans. G. Rex Smith (London: Ashgate; The Hakluyt Society, 2008); Ibn Battuta, *Rihlat Ibn Battuta*, 3 vols. (Arabic text and French translation) eds. and trans. C. Defrémery and B. R. Sanguinetti (Paris: L'Imprimerie Nationale, 1874); idem, *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*, 4 vols., trans. H. A. R. Gibb (New Delhi: The Hakluyt Society, 2004); W. M. Thackston, "Kamaluddin Abdul-Razzaq Samarqandi: Mission to Calicut and Vijayanagar," in *A Century of Princes. Sources of Timurid History and Art* (Cambridge, MA: The Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture, 1989), 299–321.

7 Marco Polo, *The Travels of Marco Polo [The Venetian]*, ed. Manuel Komroff (Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing Co., 1930), 288. For a translation of Kia Tan's itinerary, see Friedrich Hirth, and W. W. Rockhill, trans., *Chau Ju-Kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab trade in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, entitled Chu-fan-chi* (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1966), 9–14.

8 Al-Tabari, *Ta'rikh*, I: 1686; idem,*The History of al-Tabarī: Volume IX The Last Years of the Prophet*, trans. Ismail K. Poonawala (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 38–39. *Ansab al-ʿArab* gives an alternate later account, specifying that al-ʿAs first entered the Distajird quarter of Sohar and that the Julanda drove them out. Al-ʿAwtabi, *al-Ansab*, 764–5; al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 53–55. Al-Baladhuri mentions two emissaries from Mecca, the other being Abu Zayd al-Ansari. Al-Baladhuri, *Kitab Futuh al-Buldan*, 103–05; idem, *The Origins of the Islamic State*, al-Baladhuri, 116–18. Wilkinson therefore contends that ʿAmr b. al-ʿAs's mission was the culmination of this activity. For an in-depth discussion of the various accounts, and dating issues, see J. C. Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism: Origins and Early Development in Oman* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 72–77.

9 Andre Wink, "The early expansion of Islam in India," in *The New Cambridge History of Islam, Volume III: The Eastern Islamic World, Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries*, eds. David O. Morgan and Anthony Reid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79.

10 Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 71; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 88–89; al-Rawas, *Oman*, 68–69; Miles, *Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1994), 49–50; Ella Landau-Tasseron, "Arabia," in *The New Cambridge History of Islam: Volume I The Formation of the Islamic World, Sixth to Eleventh Centuries*, ed. Chase F. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 432.

11 For discussions of this early evidence, see George F. Hourani and John Carswell, *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995),

51–62; Valeria Fiorani Piacentini, "Arab expeditions overseas in the seventh century AD—working hypotheses on the dissolution of the Sasanian state apparatus along the eastern seaboard of the Arabian Peninsula," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 32 (2002): 165–73.

12 The Battle of the Masts (*al-maʿarakat dhāt al-sawārī*) is perhaps the most often cited naval incursion in maritime Islamic historiography, a decisive maritime encounter where a Muslim naval force sent by al-Muʿawiya under the leadership of ʿAbd Allah b. Saʿad b. Abi al-Sarh defeated a Byzantine fleet off Anatolia in 655. However, there is no evidence of any naval battles in the Indian Ocean during the Islamic expansion in the seventh century CE of a scale similar to the Battle of the Masts. Hourani and Carswell, *Arab Seafaring*, 57–58.

13 Al-Baladhuri, *Kitab Futuh al-Buldan*, 386–87; idem, *The Origins of the Islamic State: Volume 2*, trans. Francis Clark Murgotten (New York and London: Columbia University, 1924), 127–28; al-ʿAwtabi, *al-Ansab*, 626, 798; al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 64–65; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 92; al-Rawas, *Oman*, 50–51.

14 Al-Baladhuri, *Kitab Futuh al-Buldan*, 431–432; idem, *The Origins of the Islamic State*, II: 209; Hassan Salih Shihab, *Min Taʾrikh Bahriyyat ʿUman al-Taqlidyya* Muscat: Ministry of Heritage and Culture, 2001), 103; Piacentini, "Arab expeditions overseas," 165–67, 170; Andre Wink, "The early expansion of Islam in India," 86.

15 J. C. Wilkinson, "Ṣuḥār (Sohar) in the Early Islamic Period: The Written Evidence," in *South Asian Archaeology, 1977*, ed. Maurizio Taddei (Naples: Istituto universitario orientale, 1979), 2: 888; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 55–58.

16 Derek Kennet, "The decline of eastern Arabia in the Sasanian period," *Arabian Archaeology and Epigraphy* 18 (2007): 86–122.

17 Muhammad b. Habib, *Kitab al-Muhabbar*, ed. I. Lichtenstäder (Hyderabad: Matbaʿat al-Maʿarif al-Uthmaniya, 1942), 265; Abdulrahman al-Salimi, "Different succession chronologies of the Nabhani dynasty of Oman," *The Proceedings of the Seminar of Arabian Studies* 32 (2002): 260.

18 Valeria Fiorani Piacentini, *Beyond Ibn Hawqal's Bahr al-Fārs: 10–13th Centuries AD: Sindh and the Kij-u-Makran Region, Hinge of an International Network of Religious, Political, Institutional and Economic Affairs* (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2014), 44–70.

19 André Wink, *al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World*, 3 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1990), I: 60–63.

20 Monique Kevran, "Indian Ceramics in S. Iran and E. Arabia," in *Tradition and Archaeology: Early Maritime Contacts in the Indian Ocean*, eds. H. P. Ray and J.F. Salles (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), 42.

21 The main issue with any discussion of migration in the premodern era in Oman is that the sources do not often provide the necessary data to support any substantive quantitative analysis of most of these migrations. The archaeological record reflects patterns of trade, ceramics, and even organic materials, but qualitative evidence of demographic numbers according to ethnicity and/or religious affiliation is more difficult to accurately ascertain.

22 Al-ʿAwtabi, *al-Ansab*, 799, gives a list of the first 18 Omani men to establish Basra; it is also found in al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 66.

23 However, the Muhallib-Umayyad relationship soured during the time of his son, Yazid, who at times controlled Khurasan, Laristan, and Hormuz, but rose up against the Umayyads after being imprisoned multiple times, and was defeated. Al-ʿAwtabi, *al-Ansab*, 631–54; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 107–12; Miles, *Countries and Tribes*, 57–59; Wink, *al-Hind*, I: 52; Herbert Mason, "The role of the Azdite Muhallabid family in Marw's anti-Umayyad power struggle," *Arabica* 14 (1967): 191–207.

24 Al-Rawas, *Oman*, 78–79: Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 192–202.

25 See Bryan Averbuch, "From Siraf to Sumatra: Seafaring and Spices in the Islamicate Indo-Pacific, 9th–11th c. C.E." (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2013), 17–25, for the discussion of the use of the term Indo-Pacific, and its precedent in other fields such as marine biology.

26 Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 71–73; al-Izkawi, *Kashf al-Ghumma*, 454–55; idem, *Annals of Oman*, 10–11; Ibn Ruzayq, *al-Fath al-Mubin*, 188–89; al-Rawas, *Oman*, 64–65; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 118. No specific date is given, but Miles speculates that it took place in 696 and that they landed in Yitti. Miles, *Countries and Tribes*, 50–53.

27 Al-Baladhuri, *Kitab Futuh al-Buldan*, 435–37; idem, *The Origins of the Islamic State*, II: 215–19; Shihab, *Min Taʾrikh Bahriyyat ʿUman*, 108–09. The underlying economic motives of this expedition, establishing a port closer to Indian markets, have been noted. Andre Wink, "The early expansion of Islam in India," 86–87; and Suchandra Ghosh, "The Western Coast of India and the Gulf: Maritime Trade during the 3rd to 7th Century A.D.," in *Intercultural Relations Between South and Southwest Asia. Studies in Commemoration of E. C. L. Caspers (1934–1996)*, eds. Eric Lokjdam and Richard H. Spoor (Oxford: Archaeopress, Bar International Series, 2008), 367–371.

28 As Hourani stated, the Indian Ocean "was a sea of peace." This generalization is perhaps more valid regarding formal naval battles and expeditions, but maritime raiding was a less formal but nonetheless significant form of naval competition in the Indian Ocean. Hourani and Carswell, *Arab Seafaring*, 61. Although the frequency of these acts is difficult to quantify within a premodern context, pirates are mentioned in the *Periplus* in the first century until the arrival of the Portuguese, indicating that this activity was a systemic part of the Indian Ocean. It is unfortunate that this has not been studied in the same depth as in the Atlantic or Mediterranean.

29 Patricia Risso in her examination of piracy in the eighteenth century has noted that there appears to be no word for piracy in the historical sources, justifying the use of a less culturally loaded term for this activity. Margariti has also questioned its use, in particular in a pre-Modern Indian Ocean context. Patricia Risso, *Oman and Muscat: An Early Modern History* (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1986), 300–01; Roxanne Eleni Margariti, "Mercantile Networks, Port Cities, and "Pirate" States: Conflict and Competition in the Indian Ocean World," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 51 (2008): 545–46.

30 Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 85–89; Ibn Ruzayq, *al-Fath al-Mubin*, 194–96; Al-Rawas, *Oman*, 114–17.

31 Al-Tabari, *Taʾrikh*, 78–79; idem, *The History of al-Tabari: Volume XXVII The Abbāsid Revolution*, trans. John Alden WIlliams ((Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 201–02; al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 95–97; al-Izkawi, *Kashf al-Ghumma*, 116–18 ; idem, *Annals of Oman*, 12–13.

32 Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 102–06; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 245; Al-Rawas, *Oman*, 129–33.

33 The forced movements of Indian Ocean populations were an essential part of this southern Mesopotamian restructured economy. Members of the Jat tribe and other Sind groups were captured and forced into slavery in the marshlands of southern Iraq, joining the significant Zanj population that was growing there. Wink, "The early expansion of Islam," 89.

34 See al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, I: 82–83, for a list of some of the Omani members of the early Ibadi movement.

35 Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 180. Abu ʿUbayda ʿAbd Allah b. al-Qasim is also known as "Abu ʿUbayda al-Saghir" (Abu ʿUbayda the Small).

36 Al-Rawas, *Oman*, Appendix IV, 209.

37 K.N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 47.

38 Miles, *Countries and Tribes*, 54–55.

39 Al-Izkawi, *Kashf al-Ghumma*, III: 112; idem, *Annals of Oman*, 11; al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Ayan*, I: 73. This was not a new migration route, for the *Periplus of the Eyrthrean Sea* testifies to an Arab presence in East Africa in the first century CE, stating that Arab captains were familiar with the area and married with East African women. Abdul Sheriff, *Dhow Cultures of the Indian Ocean: Cosmopolitanism, Commerce, and Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 30.

40 See Mark Horton, "East Africa and Oman c. 600–1856," in *Oman and the Islamic World: Volume II: The Ports of Oman*, eds. Abdulrahman Salimi and Eric Staples (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, in press); also Mark Horton, *Shanga. The Archaeology of a Muslim Trading Community on the Coast of East Africa* (London: British Institute in Eastern Africa, 1996); Abdurahman Juma, *Unguja Ukuu on Zanzibar. An Archaeological Study of Early Urbanism* (Uppsala: Uppsala University Department of Archaeology and Ancient History, Studies in Global Archaeology 3, 2004).

41 Al-Farazdaq, *Divan de Férazdak, Récits de Mohammed-ben-Habib d'après Ibn el-Arabi, publié sur le manuscript de Sainte-Sophie de Constantinople*, 4 vols., ed. and trans. Richard Boucher (Paris: A. Labitte, 1870–75), I: 32 (French), I: 16 (Arabic); English translation in Alain George, "Direct Sea Trade Between Early Islamic Iraq and China: from the Exchange of Goods to the Transmission of Ideas," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 2015: 16.

42 P. Casey-Vine, *Oman in History* (London: Immel, 1995), 334–35; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 180.

43 Al-Tabari, *Ta'rikh*, 2383; al-Baladhuri, *Kitab Futuh al-Buldan*, 341; al-Masʿudi, *Muruj al-Dhahab*, I: 216, 308; Ibn Habib, *Kitab al-Muhabbar*, 265; Axelle Rougeulle, "Chinese Imports in the Islamic World," in *Tradition and Archaeology: Early Maritime Contacts in the Indian Ocean*, eds. H. P. Ray and J. F. Salles (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), 160.

44 David Whitehouse and Andrew Williamson, "Sasanian Maritime Trade," *Iran* 11 (1973): 45–48; Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation*, 50; Wink, *al-Hind*, I: 49.

45 This is found in the account by the the Chinese Buddhist Yijing (d. 713), who traveled on a *bosi* ship south. George, "Direct Sea Trade," 16. There is also suggestive, but not conclusive, evidence in Chinese textual sources that Persians or at least Persian goods were traveling to China from at least the fourth century CE. The fifth-century Chinese authors Ku Wei and Hsu Piao refer to goods such as cumin and stinking elm coming from *bosi*. Unfortunately, the term used in the Chinese literature, *bosi*, is a debated term. It has predominantly been thought to refer to West Asians generally, and Persians or Persian/Arabs specifically, but by the thirteenth century the term also refers to an area in Southeast Asia. As Whitehouse and Williamson point out, the Persian associations with the goods connected to the *bosi* (both cumin and stinking elm come from Southwest and not Southeast Asia) strongly suggest that at this time it referred to Southwest Asia. However, the references are only to goods, not people. Whitehouse and Williamson, "Sasanian Maritime Trade," 45–48; Hourani and Carswell, *Arab Seafaring*, 61–63, 75–76.

46 Whitehouse and Williamson, "Sasanian Maritime Trade," 46.

47 Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 107–15; al-Izkawi, *Kashf al-Ghumma*, 118; idem, *Annals of Oman*, 13; Miles, *Countries and Tribes*, 64–5.

48 Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 116–17.

49 Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 116; Ibn Ruzayq, *al-Fath al-Mubin*, 188–89, 198; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 257. Miles has the attack at most likely 802 but there are initial references in al-Tabari that the ʿAbbasid naval presence was still present in Oman in 805. Miles, *Countries and Tribes*, 67–68. Referring to Harun al-Rashid's orders in 805, see al-Tabari, *Tarikh, Volume XXX The ʿAbbāsid Caliphate in Equilibrium*, trans. C. E. Bosworth (1989), 255–6. The three ships were under the command of Abu Humayd b. Falj al-Huddani al-Saluti and Amru b. ʿUmar.

50 Al-Salimi, "The Omani siyar," 20.

51 Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 121; Ibn Ruzayq, *al-Fath al-Mubin*, 199: al-Izkawi, *Kashf al-Ghumma*, 121; idem, *Annals of Oman*, 14–15; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 266.

52 Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 121.

53 Al-Salimi, "The Omani siyar," 65–66.

54 Abu Sulayman Muhammad b. ʿAmir al-Afawi, *Qisas wal-Akhbar Jarat fi ʿUman* (Muscat: the Ministry of Heritage and Culture, 2007), 112.

55 Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 164–67; Shihab, *Min Taʾrikh Bahriyyat ʿUman*, 120–21.

56 Monique Kevran, "Indian Ceramics in S. Iran and E. Arabia," in *Tradition and Archaeology: Early Maritime Contacts in the Indian Ocean*, eds. H. P. Ray and J. F. Salles (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), 42.

57 Derek Kennet, *Sasanian and Islamic pottery from Ras al-Khaimah: classification, chronology and analysis of trade in the Western Indian Ocean* (Oxford: Archaeopress, Society for Arabian Studies Monographs 1, BAR S1248, 2004), 38–41.

58 Ibn Jaʿfar, *Jamiʿ*, III: 131–40; Al-Kindi, *al-Musannaf*; XVIII: 52–62; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 297–300; Valeria Fiorani Piacentini, "Sohar and the Daylamī interlude (356–443/967–1051)," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 35 (2005): 199–201; Wilkinson, "Ṣuḥār (Sohar) in the Early Islamic Period," 15–17; Bryan Averbuch, "Sohar: Forelands, Umland, and Hinterland in the History of an Omani Entrepôt," *Oman and the Islamic World, Volume II: The Ports of Oman* (in press).

59 Juris Zarins, "Aspects of recent archaeological work at al-Balīd (Zafār), Sultanate of Oman," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 37 (2007): 319; A. Shanfari, "The Archaeology of Masirah Island," 59–60; Juris Zarins and Lynne Newton, "Islamic Period Maritime Trade and Travel along the Southern Arabian Coasts of the Indian Ocean: The Case for Socotra, the Hallaniyat, Masirah and Mahut Islands," in *Oman and the Islamic World: Volume II: The Ports of Oman*, eds. Abdulrahman Salimi and Eric Staples (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, in press); Nasser al-Jahwari, "The Southern Batina Ports," in *Oman and the Islamic World: Volume II: The Ports of Oman*, eds. Abdulrahman Salimi and Eric Staples (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, in press).

60 Timothy Power, Nasser al-Jahwari, Peter Sheehan, and Kristian Strutt, "First preliminary report on the Buraimi Oasis Landscape Archaeology Project," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 45 (2015): 246.

61 John Guy, Regina Krahl, J. Keith Wilson, and Julian Raby, eds., *Shipwrecked: Tang Treasures and Monsoon Winds* (Washington, D.C. and Singapore: Arthur M. Sackler Gallery; Smithsonian Institution, 2011); Michael Flecker, "A Ninth-Century AD Arab or Indian Shipwreck in Indonesia: First Evidence For Direct Trade with China," *World Archaeology* 32 no. 3 (2001): 335–54; idem, "A 9th-Century Arab or Indian shipwreck in Indonesian waters," *International Journal of Nautical Archaeology* 29 (2): 199–217. Although a recent find of the remains of another ship in Thailand dated to roughly the same period or slightly earlier has the potential to further our understanding of trade and in particular ship construction in this time period, at present the Belitung wreck is the best documented published evidence for a shipwreck related to this trade.

62 Al-Sirafi, *Accounts of China and India*, 31.

63 Al-Masʿudi, *Muruj al-Dhahab*, I: 303.

64 Al-Sirafi records 120,000 deaths, whereas al-Masʿudi states that 200,000 people were killed. Al-Sirafi, *Accounts of China and India*, 68–69; al-Masʿudi, *Muruj al-Dhahab*, I: 303.

65 Al-Tabari, *The History of al-Tabari*, Volume XXXVI: *The revolt of the Zanj*, trans. D. Waines (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992); Alexandre Popovic, *The Revolt of African slaves in Iraq in the 3rd/9th century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Michael Bonner, "The waning of empire, 861–945," in *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, *Volume I: The Formation of the Islamic World, Sixth to Eleventh Centuries*, ed. Chase F. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 323–25. For a dissenting opinion arguing that it was not a slave revolt, see M. A. Shaban, *Islamic History: A New Interpretation: Vol. 2 A.D. 750–1055 (A.H. 132–448)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 100–01.

66 Ibn Kurdadhbih and al-Sirafi claimed it was the largest and most prosperous state at the time. Al-Sirafi, *Accounts of China and India*, 38–41; S. Maqbul Ahmad, *Arabic Classical Accounts of India and*

China (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1989), 3; Wink, *al-Hind*, I: 303–06.

67 George, "Direct Sea Trade," 15.

68 Al-Izkawi, *Kashf al-Ghumma*, 125–26 ; idem, *Annals of Oman*, 18.

69 Al-ʿAwtabi, *al-Ansab*, 781; al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 256–61; Al-Izkawi, *Kashf al-Ghumma*, 131–36. After an initial invasion, an Omani force was on the brink of driving Muhammad and his men back when reinforcements reinstated Muhammad's rule.

70 Al-Izkawi, *Kashf al-Ghumma*, 135; idem, *Annals of Oman*, 23.

71 Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 258. Ahmad b. Hilal is also known as Ahmad b. Khalil according to coins found with his name imprinted, and Wilkinson thus calls him Ahmad b. al-Khalil in his latest work. Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 329–30. Abdulrahman al-Salimi also suggests that the Saffarids were possibly also involved in northern Oman in this time period. Abdulrahman al-Salimi, "The Wajihads of Oman," *Proceeding of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 39 (2009): 374.

72 Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 330. The governor Ahmad reportedly pushed his taxes too far, attempting to take an excessive amount from the Jewish merchant named Ishaq who had made a fortune in the China trade. Buzurg b. Shahriyar al-Ramhurmuzi, *ʿAjaʾib al-Hind: min Qisis al-Milaha al-ʿArabiyya*, ed. Yusuf Al-Sharuni (London: Riad El-Rayyes, 1990), 101–04; idem, *The Book of the Marvels of India*, translated into English by Peter Quennell, based on the French translation of the Arabic text by L. Marcel Devic (New York: The Dial Press, 1929), 92–95. See Jean-Charles Ducène, "Comptes Rendus," *Journal Asiatique* 298: 2 (2010): 579–84, for a revisionist view on the authorship of *ʿAjaʾib*.

73 Al-ʿAwtabi, *al-Ansab*, 761.

74 Al-ʿAwtabi, *al-Ansab*, 761; al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 258. They were all of the Julanda b. Karkar descent.

75 Al-Istakhri, *Kitab al-Masalik wal-Mamalik*, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden: Brill, 1894), 85; Ibn Hawqal, *Surat al-Ard*, 44; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 266–67; al-Salimi, "Wajihads," 374.

76 Michael Bonner, "The Waning of Empire, 861–945," in *The New Cambridge History of Islam, Volume I: The Formation of the Islamic World, Seventh to Eleventh Centuries*, ed. Chase Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 351. The name of the movement is derived from its founder, Hamdan Qarmat.

77 They were both espousing similar messianic views while taking over large portions of North Africa including Egypt in the tenth century, although this early alliance eventually became more complicated and periodically conflictual.

78 Abdulrahman al-Salimi contends that their primary purpose for this attack on Sohar was to obtain tax revenues from the lucrative maritime trade of Sohar. Abdulrahman al-Salimi, "The Wajihads of Oman," 374–75; Abdulrahman al-Salimi, "Makramid rule in Oman," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 35 (2005): 247.

79 Rougeulle, "Chinese Imports in the Islamic world," 164.

80 Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 290–92. Yusuf b. Wajih's origins have been disputed. Abdulrahman al-Salimi contends that Yusuf was from the Huddan, and was the maternal nephew of the local Abbasid governor Ahmad b. Hilal, based on a reference by al-Tanukhi (d. 994). Wilkinson, on the other hand, states that he was installed by the Qarmatians, and is "inclined" to believe that he was from Bahrain originally. Al-Salimi, "The Wajihads of Oman," 374; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 333.

81 Al-Salimi, "The Wajihads of Oman," 376–78. For example, he was nominally a representative of the Abbasids, but he allied himself periodically with their enemies. He maintained good relations with the Ibadi Imam Abu Qasim Saʿid b. ʿAbd Allah al-Ruhayli (appointed in 932) in the interior and then later fought with his successor Imam Rashid b. Walid al-Kindi, eventually driving him from Nizwa. He originally joined Imam Abu Qasim in challenging the Qarmatian forces, and then later allied himself with the Qarmatians, even providing them with naval support when required.

82 Muhammad b. Yahya al-Suli, *Akhbar al-Radi billah wal-Muttaqi billah*, trans. Marius Canard (Algiers: Imprimerie La Typo-Litho, 1946), II: 79; al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 291–92; Shihab, *Min Taʾrikh Bahriyyat ʿUman*, 1126; Miles, *Countries and Tribes*, 106; al-Salimi, "Wajihads of Oman," 377; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 333.

83 Ibn al-Athir, *Kamil*, VIII: 494.

84 Ibn al-Athir, *Kamil*, VIII, 564, 597. This is assumed to be the Wajihad ruler ʿUmar b. Yusuf (952–65), although alternate sources state that he killed Yusuf b. al-Wajih himself. This is unlikely if al-Salimi's dating of the Wajihad family if correct. Al-Salimi, "The Wajihads of Oman," 377–78; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 343.

85 M. Bonner, The waning of empire," 364–70.

86 Ibn al-Athir, *Kamil*, VIII: 565, 568; Miles, *Countries and Tribes*, 110–11; al-Salimi, "The Wajihads of Oman," 378–79; Valeria Fiorani Piacentini, "Hormuz: *Bandar* and *Mulk* (Port and Dominion)," in *Oman and the Islamic World: Volume II: The Ports of Oman*, eds. Abdulrahman Salimi and Eric Staples (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, in press).

87 Miles, *Countries and Tribes*, 114–15. They met Buyid leader ʿAdud al-Dawla's army in Siraf.

88 Miles, *Countries and Tribes*, 116–17.

89 They landed at Khawr Fakkan, marched south to Sohar, and then reembarked with the fleet to Dhamar south of Quriyyat, where they fought and defeated the Ibadi army, chasing the Imam Ward b. Ziyad up to Nizwa, where he was killed in another battle.

90 Piacentini has effectively argued that these expeditions were part of ʿAdud al-Dawla's efforts to counteract a rising Red Sea trade fostered by the Fatimids by promoting trade in the Gulf; Valeria Fiorani Piacentini, "Sohar and the Daylami interlude," 197.

91 Ibn al-Athir, *Kamil*, VII: 207, 311; Abd al-Rahman b. Khaldun, *Kitab al-ʿIbar* (Beirut: Dar al-Fatih, 1977), IV: 1032; al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 292–93; Shihab, *Min Taʾrikh Bahriyyat ʿUman*, 128–33; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 347–48; al-Salimi, "Makramid Rule," 247–52. They also had coins minted in their name, with the title "amir al-umara"; Nicholas Lowick, "An Eleventh century coin hoard from Raʾs al-Khaimah and the question of Sohar's decline," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 16 (1986): 91.

92 Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 296–305. For his dates, I am relying on those provided by al-Salimi in *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*. This is the traditional chronological narrative regarding these two Imams, as there is debate regarding the dating of Imam al-Khalil's reign. Al-Battashi argues that Imam al-Khalil ruled after Imam Rashid, based on his premise that Imam al-Khalil helped the Yemeni Ibadi leader Abu Ishaq Ibrahim b. Qays al-Hamdani al-Hadrami fight the Sulayhid threat after 1062. However, Wilkinson rebuts this claim, citing a source claiming that Abu Ishaq broke with the Omani Imamate after Rashid's radical doctrinal claims just prior to his death, and that Imam Rashid was building on the efforts of a previous Imam, who is most likely al-Khalil. Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 348–51.

93 Ella Landau-Tasseron, "Arabia," in *The New Cambridge History of Islam, Volume I: The Formation of the Islamic World, Sixth to Eleventh Centuries*, ed. Chase F. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 437; al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, 306–316.

94 His works, *Muruj al-Dhahab wal-Maʿadin al-Jawahir* (Meadows of Gold and Mines of Jewels) and *Kitab al-Tanbih wal-Ashraf* (The Book of Notification and Broad Review), describe the Islamic world and beyond in the first decades of the tenth century. The extent of his travels has been debated. Shboul, for example, has questioned whether he in fact sailed to Sri Lanka on "the China Sea" (*al-bahr al-Sīn*), as he claims, due to the lack of personal first-hand accounts of these places in al-Masʿudi's work. Ahmad Shboul, *Al-Masʿūdī & His World: A Muslim Humanist and his Interest in non-Muslims* (London: Ithaca Press, 1979), 7.

95 al-Masʿudi, *Muruj al-Dhahab*, I: 232. He later qualifies this by stating that the Azdi shared these seas with Sirafi merchants and mariners, and that he himself sailed from the East African island

of Qanbalu to Oman in 916 with a Sirafi crew, in the time of the reign of the Omani governor Ahmad b. Hilal.

96 Shboul, *Al-Masʿūdī & His World*, 6. Today, this area is located around Chaul, just south of modern-day Mumbai.

97 Masʿudi, *Muruj al-Dhahab*, I: 307–08; Kalah in Malaysia at this time was becoming a partially Muslim port, with significant Muslim communities living there in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Wink, *al-Hind*, I: 84.

98 Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilization*, 58; Rougeulle, "Chinese Imports in the Islamic World," 167.

99 Wade, "An Early Age of Commerce," 236–37. Regarding the rise of Aden, see Roxani Eleni Margariti, *Aden and the Indian Ocean Trade: 150 Years in the Life of a Medieval Arabian Port* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). For Cholas, see Tansen Sen, "Maritime Contacts between China and the Cola Kingdom (A.D. 850–1279)," in *Mariners, merchants and oceans: Studies in maritime History*, ed. K. S. Mathew (Delhi: Manohar, 1995): 25–42.

100 Piacentini has argued that Buyid maritime policy promoted ports on the Iranian mainland and Sohar, but militarized and neglected other ports in Oman.Valeria Fiorani Piacentini, "Oman: the Cornerstone of a Maritime System," in *Oman and Overseas*, eds. M. Hoffmann-Ruf, A. al-Salimi, and H. Gaube (Hildesheim, Zurich, and New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2013), 149–52.

101 Rougeulle, "Chinese Imports in the Islamic World," 175.

102 Hikoichi Yajima, "Maritime Activities of the Arab Gulf People and the Indian Ocean World in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 14 (1977): 202.

103 David O. Morgan and Anthony Reid, "Introduction: Islam in plural Asia," in *The New Cambridge History of Islam: volume III: The Eastern Islamic World, Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries*, eds. David O. Morgan and Anthony Reid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4.

104 Ibn al-Athir, *The Annals of the Saljuq Turks: Selections from al-Kāmil fil-Tarīkh of ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr*, trans. D. S. Richards (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 253–58. For a secondary summary, see David Morgan, *Medieval Persia 1040–1797* (London and New York: Longman, 1988), 25–40.

105 Piacentini, "Oman: the Cornerstone of a Maritime System," 158; Mohammed Redha Bhacker and Bernadette Bhacker, "Qalhāt in Arabian History: Context and Chronicles," *Journal of Omani Studies 13* (2004): 30. Qavard's name is also transliterated as "Kaward," and "Kavard."

106 Bhacker and Bhacker, "Qalhāt," 30.

107 Morgan and Reid, "Introduction: Islam in plural Asia," 13. As Morgan and Reid state: "The centre of the Islamic world had shifted out of the Arab heartlands...The centre shifted, in fact, to the Persian world." For a description of the prominent Saljuq advisor, Nizam al-Mulk, see Ibn al-Athir, *The Annals of the Saljuq Turks*, 253–58; H. Bowen and C. E. Bosworth, "Nizām al-Mulk," *Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd Edition*, eds. C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs, and G. Lecomte (Leiden: Brill, 1995), VIII: 69–73;

108 Abdulrahman al-Salimi contends that there are three branches of Nabahina, which accounts for the variant accounts and confusion in their chronology. Al-Salimi, "Different succession chronologies," 261.

109 Ibn Battuta, *Ribla*, II: 227–30; idem, *The Travels*, II: 397–400. There was also a Shirazi invasion of the interior in 1275 that defeated a Nabhanid force at Sohar and then took Nizwa, before eventually retreating. Ibn Ruzayq has a different date of 1265. Casey-Vine, *Oman in History*, 187–88.

110 Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, I: 357–64; al-Izkawi, *Kashf al-Ghumma*,III: 178; al-Ruzayq, *Fath al-Mubin*, 217–20; Casey-Vine, *Oman in History*, 178–88; al-Salimi, "Omani *siyar*," 73.

111 It is primarily known as Qays in Arabic sources, but Kish in the Geniza and Persian sources. Margariti, "Mercantile Networks," 556.

112 Valeria Fiorani Piacentini, "The mercantile empire of the Tībīs: economic predominance, political power, military subordination," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 34 (2004): 252–53; Piacentini, "Oman: the Cornerstone of a Maritime System," 160–65; Margariti, "Mercantile Networks," 556–57; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 403.

113 Ibn al-Athir, *Kamil*, IX: 53; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 404.

114 Ibn Mujawir, *Tārikh*, I: 124; idem, *A Traveller*, 143; Margariti, *Aden and the Indian Ocean Trade*, 76–83. The attack was reportedly over a piece of land in Aden that the Qaysi ruler laid claim to. Margariti suggests that Qays was aware of Aden's rich trade revenues and was trying to take it over during a moment of Aden's political weakness.

115 Yaqut, *Muʿjam al-Buldan*, III: 215, English translation provided in Margariti, "Mercantile Networks," 558.

116 Yaqut, *Muʿjam al-Buldan*, III: 211–12; Yajima, "Maritime Activities," 206.

117 Benjamin of Tudela, *The Itinerary of Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela*, trans. and ed. A. Asher (New York: Hakesheth Publishing Co., N.D.), I: 136–37; Yajima, "Maritime Activities," 208.

118 Piacentini, "Oman: the Cornerstone of a Maritime System," 169; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 406.

119 Piacentini, "The mercantile empire of the Tībīs," 253–57.

120 Ibid., 254–55; Heinz Gaube and Abdulrahman al-Salimi, *The Ibadis in the Region of the Indian Ocean, Section One: East Africa* (Hildesheim, Zurich, and New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2013), 401. Gaube and al-Salimi speculate that the name al-Tibi, might originally be derived from Tiwi, the small port to the north of Qalhat on the Omani coast.

121 Ibn al-Mujawir, *Taʾrikh al-Mustabsir*, II: 288; idem, *A Traveller in Thirteenth-Century Arabia*, 290–91.

122 Al-Idrisi, *Geographie d'Edrisi*, I: 152–3; Dionisius Albertus Agius, *Classic ships of Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 86.

123 Piacentini, "Oman: The Cornerstone of a Maritime System," 158. Its dynasty was reportedly founded by either an Omani Julanda b. Karkar family, or a South Arabian migrant named Dirhem-Ko from Saba. For origin stories of Hormuz, see Pedro Teixeira, *The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, with his 'Kings of Harmuz' and extracts from his 'Kings of Persia*, trans. W. F. Sinclair and D. W. Ferguson (London: Hakluyt Society, 1901–2), 153–6; Bhacker and Bhacker, "Qalhāt," 30–31; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 405. The Portuguese traveler Pedro Teixeira (d. 6141) made a Portuguese translation of a local Hormuzi history, called *Shahnamah*, originally composed by the Hormuzi ruler Turanshah II, which Teixeira entitled "The Kings of Hormuz."

124 Piacentini, "Oman: The Cornerstone of a Maritime System," 169.

125 M.B. Vosoughi, "The Kings of Hormuz: From the Beginning until the Arrival of the Portuguese," in *The Persian Gulf in History*, ed. Lawrence G. Potter (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 91.

126 Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 406.

127 Wink, *al-Hind*, I: 56–57.

128 Piacentini, "Oman: The Cornerstone of a Maritime System," 162.

129 Vosoughi, "The Kings of Hormuz," 91. Unfortunately, he does not cite the primary source material providing evidence for the the Sohar-Hormuz migration.

130 Wink, *al-Hind*, I: 53.

131 Yajima, "Maritime Activities," 202–04; also see Wink, *al-Hind*, I: 330–31, for a discussion of Song maritime expansion. The Chinese sources also state that Mirbat was a Dhofari port populated by Sirafi merchants and was a source of frankincense, ambergris, pearls, and rosewater.

132 Wink, *al-Hind*, II: 269–75. For Mappilas, see Sheriff, *Dhow Cultures*, 280–87.

133 English translation in Gaube and al-Salimi, *The Ibadis, Section One: East Africa*, 299; also see Phillips, *Oman, a History*, 27.

134 J. C. Wilkinson, "Oman and East Africa: New Light on Early Kilwan History from the Omani Sources," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 12:2 (1981): 273; idem, *Ibāḍism*, 390–92.

135 Two of the three major themes selected by the *New Cambridge History of Islam: The Eastern Islamic World, Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries* are related to this. The first is the process of conversion itself in the maritime Indo-West Pacific, and the second is the increasing interaction with "Asian spirituality," particularly in India and Southeast Asia. The third is the impact of Central Asian populations throughout the Islamic world. Morgan and Reid, "Introduction: Islam in plural Asia," 3, 11.

136 J. C. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History* (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1955), 112; Wink, *al-Hind*, I: 85.

137 Wink, *Al-Hind*, II: 276–77; Geoff Wade, "An Early Age of Commerce in Southeast Asia, 900–1300," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 40:2 (June, 2009): 234–35.

138 Conversion to Islam was reportedly initiated by a North African Maghribi who drove off virgin-killing jinn by reciting the Quran. Ibn Battuta, *Travels*, IV: 829–30.

139 Andre D. W. Forbes, "Southern Arabia and the Islamicisation of the Central Indian Ocean Archipelagoes," *Archipel* 21 (1981): 80; Wink, *Al-Hind*, II: 276–77.

140 This was reportedly an expression of the inhabitants of Hormuz. Teixeira, *The Travels*, 266.

141 For Qutlugh-Khanids, see D. O. Morgan, "Kutlugh-Khānids," *Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd Edition*, eds. C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs, and G. Lecomte (Leiden: Brill, 1995), V: 553–54.

142 Morgan, *Medieval Persia*, 51–70.

143 Morgan, *Medieval Persia*, 82.

144 Teixeira, *The Travels*, 156–57; Ibn al-Mujawir, *Ta'rikh al-Mustabsir*, II: 288; al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-Aʿyan*, I: 358–59; al-Izkawi, *Kashf al-Ghumma*, III: 179–80; Vosoughi, "The Kings of Hormuz," 92; Bhacker and Bhacker, "Qalhāt," 35; Piacentini, "Oman: the Cornerstone," 171; J. Aubin, "Les princes d'Ormuz du XIIIe siècle," Journal Asiatique 241 (1953): 83–88. Most historians consider Rukn al-Din to be the "first of the new amirs" of Hormuz, introducing a new era in Hormuzi history. Vasoughi, "The Kings of Hormuz," 101, n. 26.

145 Teixeira, *The Travels*, 160–69; Piacentini, "Oman: the Cornerstone," 170–73; Bhacker and Bhacker, "Qalhāt," 37; Vosoughi, "The Kings of Hormuz," 92–93. Vosoughi has the shift of the capital in 1296, but Bhacker and Bhacker have it a few years later, after a Central-Asian Chaghtatay seige. Aubin has correctly pointed out that the port-city of New Hormuz was in fact called Jarun. To avoid confusion, it will be referred to as Hormuz for the sake of convenience in this chapter.

146 Teixeira, *The Travels*, 173; Floor, *The Persian Gulf: A Political and Economic History of Five Port Cities, 1500–1730* (Washington, D.C.: Mage Publishers, 2006), 7–8; Bhacker and Bhacker, "Qalhāt," 32. Bhacker and Bhacker say that this was in 1320. However, Piacentini says that it was 1330. Chapter 14, 5.

147 Teixeira, *The Travels*, 162.

148 Andrew Williamson, "Harvard Archaeological Survey in Oman, 1973: III-Sohar and the Sea Trade of Oman in the Tenth Century A.D.," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 4(1974): 57.

149 Valeria Fiorani Piacentini, "Harmuz and the ʿUmānī and Arabian world (fifteenth century)," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 30 (2000): 180.

150 These two were actually engaged in a protracted civil war, as Hormuzi local politics were particularly violent at times. Teixeira, *The Travels*, 189; Piacentini, "Harmuz and the ʿUmānī and Arabian world (fifteenth century)," 180.

151 Teixeira, *The Travels*, 186.

152 Piacentini, "Harmuz and the ʿUmānī and Arabian world (fifteenth century)," 180–82.

153 The same king allied himself with important Arab tribes such as Bani Jabr in order to come to power. Floor, *The Persian Gulf*, 41; Piacentini, "Hormuz."

154 Gaube and al-Salimi, *The Ibadis: East Africa*, 399.

155 Teixeira, *Travels*, 169.

156 Teixeira, *Travels*, 182; Bhacker and Bhacker, "Qalhāt," 38.

157 Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). Interestingly, in her division of the world economy into eight economic subsystems on pages 35–36, Oman and the strait of Hormuz are included in two overlapping subsystems, that of larger Sham, Iraq, Persia and the Gulf (IV) and that of the northwestern Indian Ocean (VI) which extended from East Africa up to Aden and included all of Oman, the Makran coast, and the west coast of India and Sri Lanka.

158 Kenneth McPherson, "Maritime Passenger Traffic in the Indian Ocean Region Before the Nineteenth Century," *The Great Circle* 10:1 (April, 1988): 50–51.

159 Translation of unpublished manuscript by Qazi ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Nimdihi in Vosoughi, "The Kings of Hormuz," 93.

160 Duarte Barbosa, *The Book of Duarte Barbosa: An account of the Countries Bordering on the Indian Ocean and their Inhabitants, written by Duarte Barbosa, and Completed about the Year 1518 A.D.*, trans. Mansel Longworth James (London: Hakluyt Society, 1918–21), I: 92–95.

161 W. M. Thackston, "Kamaluddin Abdul-Razzaq Samarqandi: Mission to Calicut and Vijayanagar," in *A Century of Princes. Sources of Timurid History and Art* (Cambridge, MA: The Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture, 1989), 300.

162 Both Yaqut and Ibn Battuta state the majority were Kharaji–Ibadi. Ibn Battuta, *Rihla*, II: 226; idem, *The Travels*, II: 397; Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 406.

163 Teixeira, *Travels*, 182; Bhacker and Bhacker, "Qalhāt," 32–33. Wilkinson has in fact argued that the kingdomof Hormuz in this era could not have existed without Qalhat.

164 Marco Polo, *The Travels of Marco Polo [The Venetian]*, 288. This may also have been in response to the increased presence of Central Asian cavalry in north India in this period. There is an increase in scientific manuals on horses in India in the twelfth century, in particular as the southern Indian environment was not conducive to horse-raising. Wink, *al-Hind*, II, 80.

165 Bhacker and Bhacker, "Qalhāt," 41.

166 Tom Vosmer, "Qalhāt, an ancient port of Oman: results of the first mission," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 34 (2004): 398–99.

167 Magalie Dartus, Daniel Etienne, Fabien Lesguer, Corinne Gosset, Apolline Vernet, Hélène Renal, Gülsü Simsek, Hervé Monchot, and Axelle Rougeulle, *The Qalhat Development Project - First Season January 21st—April 21st 2013 Preliminary Report* (Paris: CNRS, 2013), 49–50.

168 Ahmad Ibn Majid, *Al-ʿUlum al-Baḥriyya ʿinda al-ʿArab. Al-Qism al-Thani: Musannafat Shihab al-Din Ahmad b. Majid b. Muhammad b. ʿAmru b. Fadl b. Duwaik b. Yusuf b. Hasan b. Hussain b. Abi Muʿalliq al-Saʿdi b. Abi Rakaʾib al-Najdi. Al-Jiza al-Awwal: Kitab al-Fawaʾid ʾfi Usul al-ʿIm al-Bahr wa-al-Qawaʾid*, ed. Ibrahim al-Khuri (Damascus: Matbuʿat Majmaʿ al-Lughat al-ʿArabiyya bi-Damashq, 1971), 283; idem, *Arab Navigation in the Indian Ocean before the coming of the Portuguese* (London: Royal Asiatic Society Books, 1981), 213.

169 ʿImad al-Din Ismail b. Muhammad b. ʿUmar Abu al-Fida, *Taqwim al-Buldan* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1840), 98–99: Bryan Averbuch, "Sohar."

170 D. Kennet, "The Development of Northern Raʾs al Khaimah and the 14th-Century Hormuzi Economic Boom in the Lower Gulf," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 32 (2002): 151–64; Tim Power, "Julfar and the Ports of Northern Oman," in *Oman and the Islamic World: Volume II: The Ports of Oman*, eds. Abdulrahman Salimi and Eric Staples (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, in press). For a discussion of Tiwi in this time period, see L. Korn, J. Häser,

J. Scheiber, A. Gangler, M. Nagieb, S. Siebert, and A. Buekert, "Tīwī, Ash Shab and Wādī Tīwī: the Development of an Oasis on the Northeastern Coast of Oman," *The Journal of Oman Studies* 13 (2004): 72.

171 Barbosa, *The Book*, 73–74.

172 Ibn al-Mujawir, *Ta'rikh al-Mustabsir*, II: 260–61; Idem, *A Traveller*, 258; al-Salimi, *Tuhfat al-A'yan*, I: 358–59; al-Izkawi, *Kashf al-Ghumma*,III: 179–80; idem, *Annals*, 31–32.

173 Eric Vallet, "Yemeni 'oceanic policy' at the end of the thirteenth century," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 36 (2006): 289.

174 Juris Zarins, "Aspects of recent archaeological work at al-Balīd (Zafār), Sultanate of Oman," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 37 (2007): 316. A collection of sewn-boat timbers, dated from the tenth to fifteenth centuries, have been found in al-Baled. They are a particularly significant set of evidence for understanding sewn-boat construction techniques and materials in this time period. Luca Belfioretti and Tom Vosmer, "Al-Balīd ship timbers: preliminary overview and comparisons," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 40 (2010): 111–18.

175 P. Wheatley, "Geographical Notes on Some Commodities involved in Sung Maritime Trade," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (Malayan Branch) 32 (1959): 47–49 and figure 2; Juris Zarins and Lynne Newton, "Northern Indian Ocean Islamic seaports and the interior of the Arabian Peninsula," in *Oman and the Islamic World: Volume II: The Ports of Oman*, eds. Abdulrahman Salimi and Eric Staples (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, in press).

176 Ibn Battuta, *Ribla*, II: 193; idem, *The Travels*, II: 380. He also noted that it was predominantly Shaf'i in its religious orientation, suggesting a shift from its previously more diverse forms of Islam.

177 M. Tolmacheva, *The Pate Chronicle: edited and translated from mss 177, 321 & 358 of the Library of the University of Dar es Salaam* (Ann Arbor: Michigan State University Press, 1993); Gaube and al-Salimi, *The Ibadis: East Africa*, 345–46.

178 H. Neville Chittick, *Kilwa. An Islamic Trading City on the East African Coast*, 2 vols. (Nairobi: British Institute in Eastern Africa, 1974), 240–41; Horton, "East Africa and Oman c. 600–1856," Wink, *al-Hind*, I: 29.

179 Andrew Williamson, "Hurmuz and the trade of the Gulf in the 14th and 15th centuries," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 3, (1973): 52–68; Morgan, "New Thoughts on Old Hormuz: Chinese Ceramics in the Hormuz Region in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries," *Iran* 29 (1991): 67–83.

180 Wink, *al-Hind*, I: 75–77; Sheriff, *Dhow Cultures*, 280–87.

181 Indian ceramics comprised 72% of all ceramic finds in B9 in the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries, and only 27% in the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries. The biggest expansion is Qalhati ware, from 12% to 49% in the same time period. Dartus et al., *2013 The Qalhat Development Project-First Season*, 49–50.

182 Floor, *The Persian Gulf*, 27.

183 *A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia and the Papal Mission of the XVIIth and XVIIIth Centuries* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1939), II: 1041; Vosoughi, "The Kings of Hormuz," 93.

184 Thackston, "Kamaluddin Abdul-Razzaq Samarqandi," 300.